7/8/07 Principium 1643

[For a reply, see: 8/20/07, More Non Sequiturs from Mr. NS]

Principle, Application & History

Section 1

Historical testimony: Judicial criteria/presuppositional accountability

Distinctions:

1. Circumstance (true facts)
2. Principle (sound doctrinal position)
3. Application (sound doctrine logically applied via argument)

Historical testimony ought not to be abusively used as an absolute and unalterable template regarding what may or may not be done within differing circumstances. Our historic subordinate standards themselves assume the same, a prior. Since the subject of ordinary and extraordinary applications has been quite popular in our day, the same subject may serve as an example:

“11. In extraordinary cases, something extraordinary may be done, until a settled order may be had, yet keeping as near as possibly may be to the rule.” – The Form of Church Government, pg. 412

Questions:

1. Extraordinary cases when?
2. Applied in how many circumstances? One? Two? Three?
3. What are the parameters of “possibilities”?
4. How is “possibility” gauged between “settled” and “unsettled”?

Here we have a judicial determination establishing a general principle that may be applied, but it does not explicitly establish every particular case of application. It was never meant to explicitly establish every particular case of application, nor could it possibly do so. This being the case, to assume the application of our subordinate standards must have a 1-1 correspondence with every historical instance, would be to inject a foreign and impossible idea into documents themselves and the original intention of those who framed them. Such an approach operates upon a format of obsessive and abusive historical searches for the explicit. The approach would consequently choke the life out of the church from circumstance to circumstance. Logically, the church could never adapt or apply principle in any circumstance due to the absence of a preceding/explicit judicial action to “justify” it – thus terminating as a non-starter for any new judicial action throughout the history of the ecclesiastical world. Consequently, the necessary flow of judicial action would then be contingent upon the non-existent (historically explicit judicial instances), which categorically

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undermines the flow of all potential judicial action within Christ’s church. This would effectively undermine the church’s corporate sanctification, as she could never in her judicial capacity rule on any point of advancement, or instance of self-preservation within her peculiar circumstances. If such judicial action failed to have an explicit historical reference point preceding it, it would therefore qualify as “innovation”. Therefore, essentially considered, all judicial action historical must be categorized as “innovation”. Why? Because according to this approach, when any point of “newness” is introduced, this is when it is explicitly to be condemned. Logically, any degree of newness of application of principle equals termination of application. What then do we have? Indefinite termination of application. Which equals? No application. Which equals? No progressive testimony. Progression assumes an element of newness. But given the interpretive scheme floating about these days, newness necessarily assumes an element of tyranny and innovation – which implicated criteria must be equally distributed to every judicial measure (or non-judicial provision) existing throughout ecclesiastical history. Conclusion: ecclesiastical suicide.

Principles ought to be carefully distinguished:

1. A principle that can give an account for the possibility of the progressive flow of judicial and non-judicial measures (preservation of possibility).
2. A principle that cannot give an account for the possibility of the progressive flow of judicial and non-judicial measures (destruction of possibility).

Choose wisely.

Omniscience: A blasphemous prerequisite (implicit faith exemplified)

Judicially “mapped out” criteria to appeal to in order to apply Presbyterian principle within every circumstance is non-existent. Why? Because it’s impossible. Our standards never assumed such impossible criteria was necessary, hence the absence of an historical attempt at the same. To assume that every instance of application of Presbyterian principle must have explicit historical/judicial warrant, would be to effectively assume there must be an explicit and exhaustive judicial “mapping out” of every conceivable circumstantial application of Presbyterian government before such circumstances are known. But such an implicated criterion reduces to utter absurdity, as it consequently must include an attribute of omniscience (on the part of the composers of such an infinitely exhaustive judicial standard) in order for the criterion to functionally/conceptually succeed. The consequence renders new application as an impossibility – infinitely regressing throughout the threads of all ecclesiastical circumstances in history.

Conclusion: Such an implicated criterion being presented (necessarily flowing from the argument) would logically assume a necessity of omniscience in order to function. But this clearly cannot be lawful or reasonable, as it’s clearly blasphemous. Therefore, etc.

If “P” then “Q”. Not “Q” therefore not “P” (modus tollens)

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Distinction:

1. Lawful appeals to historical testimony (agreeing with scripture) as an instance of historical accountability regarding knowledge received.
2. Abusive appeals to historical testimony as an absolute and “stationary” testimony without room for progression or advancement in application (fallaciously applying a corrupted version of the ‘regulative principle’ to historical testimony – implicit faith exemplified).

Irony:

1. Where is #2 taught in our historical subordinate standards?
2. Is #2 condemned in our historical subordinate standards?

Providential convenience

Providential convenience obviously refers to degrees of convenience within each historical set of circumstances.

With that, a few fundamental topics/questions should be established:

1. Principles of government and the extension of authority within differing contexts.

2. The nature of this concept "extraordinary," and whether or not circumstance presents a potential fluctuating format regarding procedure within extraordinary/unsettled contexts, especially given the very broad set of circumstances history presents to the church (and all people, for that matter – Ch 1 sec 6 WCF).

3. What are the most fundamental parameters regarding the nature of "convenience"?

4. Assuming 1, 2, & 3 were sufficiently established, is this concept of "convenience" itself subject to fluctuation on any level?

These are important questions relating to the application of government civil and ecclesiastical, and are introduced here to highlight issues that are threaded throughout the thoughts below.

Principle and Application: What are the constituent elements of a Presbyterial church?

“The several congregations in Jerusalem being one church, the elders of the church are mentioned as meeting together for acts of government; which proves that those several

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congregations were under one presbyterial government. And whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition. Nor doth there appear any material difference betwixt the several congregations in Jerusalem, and the many congregations now in the ordinary condition of the church, as to the point of fixedness required of officers or members.” – The Form of Church-Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition of the WCF)

Presbyterian principle 1. Fixedness of church officers or members is not essential to the being of a Presbyterian church. Our subordinate standards explicitly state this scriptural principle.

Here we have a general determination on the judicial level establishing a principle that may be applied, but it does not establish every particular case of application.

Application of Presbyterian principle:

In your several circumstances you may apply this principle of Presbyterial government, though every instance of application is not explicitly or judicially mapped out for you – yet such instances are implicitly mapped out. This principle wasn’t held by just a few Presbyterian theologians, but was rather assumed by an Assembly of judicious divines:

Rutherford, beginning with Hooker’s assertion (which in essence is the assertion of our modern day dissenting brethren):

"There must be many elders appropriated to these congregations, which have power over their own only (saith he) and not over others.”

Rutherford responds,

“That we deny. I should say, any other than save this worthy man, (whom I much loved and ever honored) who would write a book against Presbyterian government, and yet did not understand the constituent elements of a presbyterial church, deserves to be censured; for Mr. H yieldeth all the Presbyterial church that MR. R. pleads for, or that the famous Synod as Westminister desire, where there were eminently learned men , who well understood Presbyterial government, and all adversaries thereof…see the Assembly of Divines to the seven dissenting Brethren, An. 1644. Suppose in Jerusalem (saith the Synod) there were ten congregations, and twenty officers, feeding and ruling them in common, not one of them fixed to any single congregation. This kind of Presbytery would pass for a lawful government:" -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of a Survery, Pg. 245, 246.

"Mr. H being to evert Presbyterian Government, he begins at the pillars. The Presbyterian Church consists of three pillars. There must be several congregations, made entire of such members to make up an integral body of rulers and ruled. Ans. There is a crack in this pillar, it is not essential to a Presbyterian Church that all the congregation be entire, and formed churches, having their own officers distinct from the offices of others, we cannot

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determine that Matthias had a determinate flock, to which only he was a fixed pastor; and Peter another, and John a third, we rather judge the whole twelve fed in common [what if it were six or three ruling in common? – NS], sometimes in one congregation, in this house, daily, and sometimes in another; but all the huge thousands could not feed in one house, otherwise many congregations framed and fixed, or not framed and fixed, are all under one Presbytery, as the learned and reverend Assembly at Westminster teacheth. If the pillars be dreams, the house that Mr. H. storms is also a dream." -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of a Survey, Pg. 185, 186.

“Their third Argument is thus framed: That Church-power, which cannot shew a set and constant Divine Rule for its Variation, and Subordination, and Ultimate Independency, is not of God, and so may not be; But this variation of Church power into these Subordinations cannot shew any such steady and constant rule for these things, Ergo. Ans. First, To their Major. If by a set and constant rule, they mean by a particular & express rule; we deny it; It is not necessary that there be a particular express rule for the local bounds or circumstantial variations in Government. If they mean, the general rules of the Word, applied and made use of, with the help of Prudence and Nature’s light; we grant it, and it helps not their cause.” -- Answer from the Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting brethren, Pg. 157

The Presbyterian principles assumed by Rutherford and Westminster against the independents are identical to those found within the subordinate standard noted above (Form of Presbyterial Church-government). In this case, they are applying the general principle to Jerusalem as an example of how the form of government may function within one circumstantial instance. It would be utter nonsense to assert that Rutherford or Westminster were assuming the precise geographical boundary of Jerusalem as the limit of the potential flow of judicial authority (especially in unsettled times); cross the line, you’re not a member? What of those lying outside the parameters of Jerusalem? What of those who are residing 40+ miles distant from their eldership? Are they excommunicated due to circumstantial inconvenience? How about 80 miles? 160 miles? The notion is absurd, as it functions upon a merciless and unbiblical principle of Independency repugnant to mercy and common sense. Our subordinate Standards, the Assembly of divines that framed them, and the General Assembly of the church of Scotland approving them, all assume the application of a principle may change from circumstance to circumstance, though there is no essential difference in the principle itself. The instance of Jerusalem is but one of many circumstances in which Presbyterian principle may be applied. To argue that we are not in 1-1 correspondence with Jerusalem is nothing more than a historiographical accent fallacy, and a flawed/wavering interpretive grid that confuses the nature of summary law with case law:

Distinction:

1. A general principle
2. A case of application

“The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added,

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whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word: and that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed.” – WCF, Ch 1, sec 6

It is common (general) to human action and society to preserve itself through the ordinance of government:

1. If such a government is available.
2. If it includes mutual consent between the governors and those governed (formal or tacit).
3. If visible communion provides a basis for the same.

According to scripture, our subordinate standards, and the light of nature, there are some circumstances that are common to human actions and societies that may modify the form of application of Presbyterian government. This is no “innovation” in government, but rather a highlighting of the potential fluctuating nature of the “outward form” of administration (fluctuation of the outward form, with the essential form flowing from divine right).

Gillespie assumes this biblical/light of nature principle:

“But since we cannot find, in the apostles’ times, any other presbytery or assembly of elders beside that which has been spoken of [a presbyterial assembly ruling in common – NS], how comes it, may some say that in our church of Scotland, and other reformed churches, did appoint two sorts of presbyterial assemblies [was this appointment sinful on the part of the Church of Scotland because it differed from another historical form? – NS], one (which here we call sessions) wherein the pastor of the parish, together with those elders within the same, whom the apostle calls governments and presidents, put order to the government of that congregation; another (which here we call presbyteries) wherein the pastors of sundry churches, lying near together, do assemble themselves? Which difficulty yet more increases, if it is objected that neither of these two does in all points answer or conform itself unto that primitive form of presbytery whereof we speak.”

“ANSWER. The division and multiplication of parishes, and the appointment of particular pastors to the peculiar oversight of particular flocks, together with the plantation of churches in villages as well as in cities, have made it impossible for us to be served with that only one form of presbytery which was constitute in the apostles’ times. But this difference of the times being (as it ought to be) admitted, for an inevitable cause of the differences of the former, both those two forms of presbyterial meetings appointed by the church of

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Scotland do not only necessarily result from that one apostolic form, but likewise (the actions of them both being laid together) do accomplish all these ordinary ecclesiastical functions which were by it performed.“ – George Gillespie, English Popish Ceremonies, pg. 357

Two Presbyterial forms are to be distinguished:

1. A primitive/extraordinary and unsettled form of Presbyterian Church-government (in greater or lesser numerical form) governing in common, whose boundary of jurisdiction is not fixed/limited to any single congregation.

2. An advanced/ordinary and settled form of Presbyterian Church-government, inclusive of fixed ministers or elderships positioned in specific sections of the visible church (congregations). This form includes greater and lesser presbyterial assemblies subordinating given the circumstantial bounds of their charge (accomplishing the same ends the primitive form accomplishes, though in a more settled and tightly knit way).

Position: Two forms of Presbyterian Church-government accomplishing the same ends (to greater or lesser degrees) -- both have being, but differ in well being. This distinction is in agreement with, and assumed by our subordinate standards.

1. The “difference of the times” qualifies the measures that may be taken within each “case” of time-application.
2. “Nearness of consociation” is the ordinary Presbyterian rule when referring to jurisdictional boundaries, not an extraordinary measure taken:

“Great difference also there is betwixt ordinary power to be exercised constantly, and ordinarily, because of nearer consociation of the Churches, in those things that concern that church in particular: suppose a Presbyterial or congregational Church, and a power to be exercised, but more rarely, not ordinarily, because of the less communion visible, and great local distance of the Churches, as it falleth out in the whole visible Church.” – Samuel Rutherford, Due Right of Presbyteries, pg. 301

This is a general distinction applying in differing contexts. Acts of Church power “more rarely” exercised are not confined to the context of greater judicial assemblies (such as a general assembly or ecumenical assembly), but apply to lesser judicial assemblies within differing contexts as well:

“Secondly, the farther that the members, or Churches either congregational, Presbyterial, or National are removed in local distance, one from another, the less is the visible and external communion of rebuking, comforting, and admonishing one another; yet the power

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and obligation of these duties are not removed.” – Samuel Rutherford, Due right of Presbyteries, Pg. 300

“…for, as I say in that place, Presbyterial Churches & Congregational in their being are of divine institution, but in their local bounds, and determinate number of members, they are things of conveniency, of order, and providential necessity, not of divine institution;” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 113

Using Gillespie’s biblical argument (‘biblical’ because there is no contradiction between scripture and the light of reason):

The current state of the church has rendered it impossible to apply a settled/ordinary model of church government, leaving the option of governing in a more common way – especially when it is morally possible under the current circumstances to have a government ruling in common. However, it is physically/morally impossible for all to ordinarily meet together within the same walls (similarly as it was in Jerusalem). Though, the frequency of judicial administration may fall out more rarely (as all cannot meet within the same location), visible acts of communion are still functionally possible and doctrinally secure. This is primarily due to the fact that Presbyterian government is not contingent upon “fixedness” of “ministers” or “members” to congregations – Form of Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition). Though more ordinary acts of judicial administration certainly decrease under the present circumstances (given the decrease in visible communion), nevertheless, judicial administration may still proceed, just not as frequent given the decrease in visible communion. However, technology may certainly influence/enhance the frequency of administration (more on this subject below). It is also granted that judicial administration may decrease due to the intrinsic weakness of a small eldership, as it lacks a greater quantity of “eyes” to assist in its judicial capacity. True, higher courts and greater quantities of “eyes” will less frequently err. Nevertheless, walls of discipline are not contingent upon higher and thicker walls not yet erected. Frequency of discipline may be contingent upon greater walls of discipline, but not discipline intrinsically or essentially considered. Judicial power is not derivative, but intrinsic in all parts of the political body (Mt 18:20):

"…there is no such cursory derivation to be dreamed of; but because the Catholic visible Church is the great organical body whereof Christ Jesus God blessed forever is head and King, & it is totum integrale, therefore there is no derivation either by climbing up stairs, or going down, but Jesus Christ hath communicated his power to this great political body, and all its parts immediately." – Samuel Rutherford, Due Right, Pg 383.

"Fourthly, hence it doth not follow, that because the catholic representative visible Church is the first subject of the power of the keys, that the power of Excommunication is derived from the visible Church to a Presbyterial Church, or that a Presbyterial Church cannot excommunicate without consulting with, or fetching authority from the Catholic visible Church: Because the Catholic visible Church is a great integral body of Jesus Christ, and he is the head of this body; because though the power of seeing by order of nature be first in the whole man, and then in the Eye, yet the power of seeing in the Eye is not derived from the rest of the body, from Hands, Legs, Shoulders, Arms, to the Eye. The light is first in the whole Body of the Sun, as the first and prime subject of light; yet supposing now the

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received opinion of Astronomers, that the body of the Sun doth exceed the quantity of the Earth an hundred and sixty and seven times, it doth not follow that this or that part of the Sun hath no light intrinsical in it; but that which is derived from the whole body of the Sun; for then this or this part of the Sun should have borrowed light derived to it from another: so the Soul doth at one and the same instant, animate, and quicken the whole organized body as its first matter and subject, but it doth not follow that the Hand hath life derived to it from the whole body: so because the power of the keys is intrinsical in the Presbytery, as in an Oecumenical councel: it doth not follow, that the power that is intrinsical in the Presbytery is by derivation, or borrowed and at the second hand, from the Catholic visible Church. The power of the keys, by order of nature, is only in the catholic representative Church, as in the first subject, but in order of time, this power is communicated from the head to Christ to all the integral parts of this great body according to the capacity of every part." -- Due Right of Presbyteries, Pg. 304 & 305.

When a church court is in its smallest form, it ought not to proceed on its own when it may conveniently consociate with other churches. Nevertheless, given the intrinsic power this presbyterial assembly has from Christ, it may apply ecclesiastical discipline when no other officers may be found, and therefore has warrant to exercise entire jurisdiction within that circumstance – Mat 18:20; The Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, pg. 405; Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, pg. 195 & 196; The Divine Right of Church Government, pg. 210 (Sundry ministers in London).

2^nd Book of Discipline CH 7, sec 10. Necessity of fixed ministers/elderships in each congregation in order to establish a common government?

The 2^nd Book of discipline states the following regarding those congregations which circumstantially could not have their own particular presbyterial assemblies (congregational elderships):

"The first kind and sort of assemblies [local eldership--NS], although they are within particular congregations, yet they exercise the power, authority, and jurisdiction of the kirk with mutual consent, and therefore bear sometimes the name of the kirk. When we speak of the elders of the particular congregations, we mean not that every particular parish can, or may, have their own particular elderships, especially to landward; but we think three or four, more or fewer, particular kirks may have one eldership common to them all, to judge their ecclesiastical causes. Albeit this is meet, that some of the elders be chosen out of every particular congregation, to concur with the rest of their brethren in the common assembly, and to take up the delations of offences within their own kirks, and bring them to the assembly. This we gather from the practice of the primitive kirk, where elders, or colleges of seniors, were constituted in cities and famous places." Ch 7, sec 10. 2^nd Book of Discipline.

Our dissenting brethren’s position regarding this section:

“~ The Second Book of Discipline and Our Application ~

As we consider application to our own day, we read (emphasis ours), ‘Albeit this is meet, that some of the Elders be chosen out of every particular Congregation, to agree with the rest of their brethren in the common assembly…’ Therefore we must ask: Q 1.6b: If the “Common Session” application were granted, would not Edmonton alone qualify since only they have Elders in their locations (and possibly Albany)?” – “Charitable Inquiry,” 6/04/06

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To highlight an historical circumstance of certain ministers coming from congregations, as if it were prerequisite for every congregation to have fixed ministers in order to establish a common eldership, is to inject the doctrine of Independency into a Presbyterian subordinate standard, and to commit the fallacy of accent. Fixedness of ministers or members is not an essential pillar to the being of a Presbyterian Church. Why anyone would inject a blatantly Independent doctrine into a Presbyterian subordinate standard remains a mystery. The only charitable conclusion might be that such individuals are seeking to support Independent presuppositions in the name of “Presbyterianism” -- mistakenly assuming such principles to be essential to the Presbyterial system.

Note, the more recent form of Church-government, by an Act of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, was assumed to be in conformity with the books of discipline on this very point regarding the essence of Presbyterian government:

“The General Assembly being most desirous and solicitous, not only of the establishment and preservation of the Form of Kirk-government in this kingdom, according to the word of God, Books of Discipline, acts of General Assemblies, and National Covenant, but also of an uniformity in Kirk-government betwixt these kingdoms, now more straightly and strongly united by the Solemn League and Covenant…” -- Assembly at Edinburgh, February 10, 1645. Sess 16.

Question:

If the 2^nd Book of Discipline is to be interpreted as it has been of late -- which interpretation seems to absolutely assume that common elderships can only rule over congregations being fixed with ministers --then why would the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland assume the more recent form of Kirk-government to be in conformity with the books of discipline on the essentials of Kirk-government? The more recent form of government explicitly states a principle diametrically opposed to the flawed interpretation of the 2^nd Book mentioned above:

“The several congregations in Jerusalem being one church, the elders of the church are mentioned as meeting together for acts of government; which proves that those several congregations were under one presbyterial government. And whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition. Nor doth there appear any material difference betwixt the several congregations in Jerusalem, and the many congregations now in the ordinary condition of the church, as to the point of fixedness required of officers or members.” – The Form of Church-Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition)

To maintain a position that assumes a common government may only function when every congregation is fixed or framed with officers is essentially to maintain the following:

Fixedness or unfixedness of ministers or members is not all one as to the truth of the proposition.

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This is in direct contradiction with our subordinate document on an explicit point of Presbyterian government, and a point-blank promotion of Independency. Consequently, such an approach necessarily injects a contradiction between the 2^nd Book of discipline and the more recent form of Presbyterian Church-government – thus implying the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland was functioning upon an Independent dream regarding an essential point of ecclesiastical government in 1645. Presbyterian documents (especially sanctioned by judicial authority) must not be interpreted using principles of Independency. Such an approach mutilates the essence of historical/biblical Presbyterian government found within the documents themselves. If the purpose was merely to prove that the present application of government (RPNA) doesn’t match because of a possible higher numerical presence of ministers mentioned within the 2^nd Book, and the possible presence of ministers within each congregation mentioned, then we’re certainly left with critical problems. We now have mere circumstantial/incidental differences being fallaciously accented with the vain hope of establishing an irrelevant distinction. It’s already been demonstrated that it’s not essential for congregations to be fixed with officers in order to be ruled. So then, what purpose does it serve to highlight ministers coming from the several congregations to form a common eldership?

1. If the “interpretation” from the “other side” does not assume that every congregation had to be fixed with a minister in order to be ruled in common, then what was the purpose of accenting the presence of ministers within the same congregations?
2. If the purpose was simply to point out an incidental difference within that circumstance, then what does this prove? Answer: It proves there was an incidental difference, nothing more.
3. If the purpose was to highlight the possible higher numerical presence of ministers within that circumstance, it would only essentially be warranted if it had to do with the essence of a court. If such an accent did not have reference to the essential nature of a court, then the approach fails to address a fundamental issue within the controversy (expediential warrant will be addressed below).

It would be consistent to view Ch 7 sec 10 in the 2^nd Book of Discipline as assuming the same principles advanced within the more recent form of Government approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (pg. 408). This is not only because the Assembly explicitly stated the more recent form of Kirk-government to be in conformity with the Books of discipline on this point, but because the arguments are conceptually the same, and referring to the same historical instance:

2nd Book of Discipline Ch 7, sec 10:

“Albeit this is meet, that some of the elders be chosen out of every particular congregation, to concur with the rest of their brethren in the common assembly. This we gather from the practice of the primitive Kirk, where elders, or colleges of seniors, were constituted in cities and famous places.”

Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition):

“And whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition. Nor doth there appear any material difference betwixt the several congregations in Jerusalem, and the many

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congregations now in the ordinary condition of the church, as to the point of fixedness required of officers or members.”

The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland assumed the more recent form of Kirk-government to be in conformity with the Books of discipline on this essential point of ecclesiastical government. ‘Conformity’ assumes non-contradiction. If there is no contradiction, then logically, it is necessary to conclude that the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland assumed Ch 7 sec 10 in the 2^nd Book of Discipline did not assume churches had to be fixed or framed with ministers in order to be governed. It would simply be absurd to assume Scottish Presbyterians would appeal to an exclusively Independent doctrine of government to support a Presbyterian platform. In this instance, our dissenting brethren are insisting that we believe their interpretation of the 2^nd Book of discipline, rather than believe the interpretation of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Numbers do not justify, but in all probability, I think the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland had their principles together to a much higher degree than our Independently minded brethren.

Inference: Formal commissioners not an essential Pillar to a Presbyterial Church/Principles of architecture

If “fixedness” of ministers or members is not an essential pillar to a Presbyterial Church, then logically, formal commissioners being sent from congregations to Presbyteries (a more settled circumstance) is not essential to a Presbyterial Church either. There is no essential need for delegation of officers from churches to Presbyteries in order for them to perform common acts of government, just as there is no essential need for delegation within a congregation for elders to meet for acts of jurisdiction:

“The whole elders of six congregations in a City may all meet in one common Presbytery, without any delegation; and that is a Presbyterial Church, as is the meeting of a congregational Eldership.” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 186

“The two first Pillars of a Presbyterial Church, to wit, 1. Framed Churches. 2. Formal commissioners sent to Presbyteries, are to us no pillars. To Mr. Hooker they are.” – Samuel Rutherford, marginal note on pg. 186, Survey of the Survey

Those claiming to represent the true nature of a Presbyterial Church, who maintain that a fixed/local ministry and formal commissioners to higher courts are essential to the being of a Presbyterial form of government, confuse the being of a Presbyterial Church with the well being of a Presbyterial Church. A fixed & local ministry is not essential to the being of a Presbyterial Church, but essential to the greater and higher increase of a Presbyterial Church’s well being. If there is no fixed ministry, there can be no delegation of a fixed officer to a higher court (a ‘non-entity’ is not subject to delegation).

Distinction:

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1. Ordinary greater or lesser Presbytery (‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ in relation to presence of/access to greater courts)
2. Extraordinary greater or lesser presbytery (‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ in relation to the numerical form regarding the quantity of members ruling in a common judicial assembly)

Some seem to confine the only form of Presbyterial government to a more advanced/settled platform, and upon this assumption build their argument against the present unsettled platform in the RPNA. It’s as if our dissenting brethren believe the only form of Presbyterial government in history was inclusive of an advanced/settled model, and because our current platform of government does not in every particular line up with a more settled model, it’s therefore to be condemned. The “lesser presbytery” present in our day is not an ordinarily fixed lesser presbytery. It is rather, in its essence, a lesser presbytery in numerical form ruling in common -- or lesser judicial assembly ruling in common (if any wish to dispute about names). One might as well condemn Rutherford and Westminster (and the Apostles) on this point. Observe again:

"Mr. H being to evert Presbyterian Government, he begins at the pillars.The Presbyterian Church consists of three pillars. There must be several congregations, made entire of such members to make up an integral body of rulers and ruled. Ans. There is a crack in this pillar, it is not essential to a Presbyterian Church that all the congregation be entire, and formed churches, having their own officers distinct from the offices of others, we cannot determine that Matthias had a determinate flock, to which only he was a fixed pastor; and Peter another, and John a third, we rather judge the whole twelve fed in common, sometimes in one congregation, in this house, daily, and sometimes in another; but all the huge thousands could not feed in one house, otherwise many congregations framed and fixed, or not framed and fixed, are all under one Presbytery, as the learned and reverend Assembly at Westminster teacheth. If the pillars be dreams, the house that Mr. H. storms is also a dream." -- A Survey of a Survey of that Summe of Church Discipline, Samuel Rutherford. Pg. 185, 186.

Questions:

1. Do we have an absolute necessity of advanced Presbyterial gradations here?
2. Do we have an absolute necessity of immediate and formal commissioners sent from congregations to form higher courts?
3. Do we have fixed officers in congregations?
4. Or, do we have an eldership (in greater or lesser numerical form) ruling in common: ruling and feeding from house to house given the huge thousands of visible converts not immediately able to have a local ministry/eldership?

Our dissenting brethren’s observation:

“All architectures and industrial designers recognize a vital “light of nature” principle concerning structure, “Form follows Function”. The shape of a building or object should be predicated on its intended purpose.44 If the model serves the ability to perform, then success of the model is evaluated by performance. But if it isn’t working, then why use the form? We believe the sincere and fair questions we have asked will help us all evaluate the form and function of this organization.” – “Charitable Inquiry, “ 6/04/06

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What also must be evaluated is how one defines “not working,” and what set of ecclesiastical presuppositions are being assumed in the attempted evaluation. Is “success” based upon the highest degree of a thing? If the highest degree is not attained, does this mean it does not work to any degree? When considering the presence and absence of a thing, does consequence factor in? Is the “intended purpose” contingent upon the most ideal circumstance, or rather what’s presently existing/available? In our day, it’s as if some assume the highest and most advanced form of Presbyterial government must instantaneously be established in order for there to be a lawful ecclesiastical government. This conclusion is drawn due to the numerous appeals our modern Independents make to the characteristics of such an ordinary and advanced context, as if such advanced characteristics are essential pillars to the being of presbyterial form of government. Their essential argument must be as follows:

Warrant for a foundation must proceed upon the fruits of a finished product. A foundation’s warrant for existence is contingent upon the superstructure stemming from it (when the superstructure does not yet exist): if you cannot prove the existence of the superstructure, you have no warrant to operate upon the foundation essential to its establishment.

Personally, reasoning of this quality may be some of the worst I’ve ever seen. These brethren highlight the necessity of architectural structure and certain rules associated with the same, yet apparently exclude the fundamental necessity of an architectural foundation before the structure can be erected. They highlight the absence of a perfect model as if it disqualifies the existence of an imperfect/incomplete model:

Question: Why can’t we stand upon the 1^st floor?

Our brethren’s apparent answer: Because the 20^th floor is not yet erected.

It should also be obvious that such architectural presuppositions effectively destroy the possibility of all architectural advancement. With this held in view, it appears that our dissenting brethren would rather tear all structure down, and have no building, rather than preserve the blocks already laid being essential to building upward. In conclusion, one would have to ask the following:

How could such a program “work” when building an organization – ecclesiastical, or civil? On a physical level, I suppose such an approach might possibly work in the absence of such a thing as gravity (building in the air?).

Ordinary & Extraordinary: Similarity vs. Identity

In extraordinary cases something extraordinary may be done, yet keeping as close to the rule as possible. The fact that something “extraordinary” is being done assumes that it differs in some respect with what would occur within an “ordinary” context. Highlighting “ordinary” means of ecclesiastical government as justification to reject “extraordinary” means of ecclesiastical government is a remarkable display of a severe lapse in critical judgment. “Keeping as close to the rule” does not assume identity with the rule itself; in such a case the principle itself becomes vaporous, and inapplicable. Given this approach, there could never be an “extraordinary” instance in any circumstance, because it would differ in some sense from the ordinary rule. Therefore, to continually reference “ordinary rules” as justification to reject practices falling explicitly within the category of the “extraordinary” is to abuse/confuse distinction itself (or rather

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destroy distinction), and therefore undermine all possibility of any extraordinary measure being taken – thus, consequently destroying the following scriptural principle:

“But if ye had known what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the guiltless.” – Mt 12:7.

Objection: “We can’t just do anything in the name of ‘extraordinary’!!”

Who ever questioned that? We also can’t just exclude everything “extraordinary” because it differs in some sense from the ordinary rule. Just because a practice differs in some sense from the ordinary rule does not necessarily mean it’s subject to condemnation, but in such a case may certainly flow from the “rule” itself. A common judicial assembly ruling over a few select societies, families, and individuals, by mutual consent, having access to mutual communication and deliberation (verbal or written), generally working from house to house in its limited capacity to encourage and edify a common membership, is a Presbyterial church. However, if the criterion is that it must perform to the highest degree and on the most intimate/edifying levels across the board, then such a criterion is flawed, and a condemnation of the faithful throughout history. The question is not whether extraordinary measures must “serve the ordinary rule” but rather whether the attempt to comply with the ordinary rule must serve to the highest degree. If it does not serve to the highest degree, does this undermine the extraordinary measure taken? It would be foolish to assume such, as the assumption would nearly wipe out any extraordinary measure taken in any circumstance. “Ordinarily” when extraordinary measures are engaged, they assume the presence of insufficiency to accomplish all ordinary duties in an ordinary way. The entrance of an extraordinary measure assumes insufficiency. Insufficiency assumes a decrease in the quality of the framework then established. Again, does this “decreased quality” therefore disqualify the extraordinary measure taken? If so, there could hardly be any extraordinary measure taken, as each extraordinary measure would logically be undermined in the instance of the attempted application – indefinite termination of extraordinary application.

Distinction:

1. Lawful appeals to ordinary rules in extraordinary contexts (to remain as close to them as possible, though providential occurrence renders perfect application impossible).
2. Abusive appeals to ordinary rules in extraordinary contexts (assuming any extraordinary measure not performing to the highest degree must therefore be prohibited).

“…yet keeping as near as possibly may be to the rule”

“As near” assumes non-identity. “Non-identity” assumes the presence of distinction. “Distinction” obviously assumes the presence of difference. “Difference” must admit of degrees. However, “degrees of difference” do not necessitate unlawful, or inexpedient.

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Level of proof: Habitual instances of irrelevant theses. Ecclesiastical boundaries considered.

The burden of proof lies on those who have not yet proven that the present extraordinary application of government contradicts scripture (RPNA). As it seems, what has predominately been referenced has been confined to incidental differences and abusive appeals to ordinary contexts – such appeals being vain and circular motions conducive to division, strife, and Independent instances of spinning Penelope’s web. Let the present judicial platform be proven to be an unlawful species of an extraordinary measure taken, and on this level proven to be contradictory to scripture, and our testimony. Habitual instances of emphases being placed on the “ordinary & settled rule” equals habitual instances dripping with irrelevant thesis fallacies. Multiplied instances of this nature do not equal proof – a thousand subordinate standard references, or not. Proving what is not at issue proves only one thing, namely what is not at issue -- and therefore nothing at all.

“The ordinary way of dividing Christians into distinct congregations, and most expedient for edification, is by the respective bounds of their dwellings. First, because they who dwell together, being bound to all kind of moral duties one to another, have the better opportunity thereby to discharge them; which moral tie is perpetual; for Christ came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. Secondly, the communion of the saints must be so ordered, as may stand with the most convenient use of the ordinances, and discharge of moral duties, without respect of persons. Thirdly, The pastor and people must so nearly cohabit together, as that they may mutually perform their duties each to other with most conveniency.” – Form of Church Government, pg. 403, 404

Questions:

1. Does this section of the form of government say “The only way of dividing, etc,” or does it say “The ordinary way of dividing, etc”?
2. To what purpose does one highlight “ordinary” rules as if there were disagreement with such points?
3. Does not the invoking of the term “ordinary” assume, a priori, that there may be an extraordinary way?
4. To what purpose does one highlight “ordinary” rules when the same document explicitly states that in “extraordinary” contexts something extraordinary may be done?

“11. In extraordinary cases, something extraordinary may be done, until a settled order may be had, yet keeping as near as possibly may be to the rule.” – The Form of Church Government, pg. 412 (FPP edition)

It is an inversion to condemn extraordinary practices “because they do not in every particular identify with the ordinary rule”. However, it is logical and agreeable to appeal to the ordinary rule in order to remain as close as possible when operating within extraordinary/unsettled/broken contexts:

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“If the six swarms, which issue out of the numerous Church of Jerusalem, disturb the peace, and make war and division in the church, it is strange. The Eldership or Presbytery over these six swarms, so separated by many miles in divers Colonies, may either meet and exercise discipline, and dispense censures to these six swarms not yet settled, and provided with Officers, or they may not meet. To say they may not meet for that end, is to deny that they are under one Presbytery of the same chosen Elders, contrary to what Mr. H said. If they may meet to dispense censures, here shall be ruling Elders & no physical possibility of teaching the swarms so separated as forty miles, they may happily hear of written Decrees, as Acts 16.4 but cannot be edified by preaching. 2.So this Church Congregational which cannot comely and comfortably meet to partake of all ordinances, is no ordinance of Christ, and so no Congregational Church. But such are these swarms that are 40 miles distant.” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 244, 245

Questions:

1. Do these “six swarms” have easy access to their rulers?
2. Are they cohabiting ordinarily within the same location?
3. Are they fixed with officers?
4. Is “forty miles” a universal and absolute standard of mileage universally and absolutely received, enduring to the consummation of all things?
5. Within that context, would 80 miles be any different than 40 miles? 160 miles any different than 80 miles? Or, given the circumstance, would one make a difference more than the other, given the “point of no return” regarding the possibility of ordinary acts of government?
6. Does a written decree lose its authority if extending past 40 miles? 80 miles? 160 miles?
7. According to Rutherford, does a written decree lose its authority if extended outside of a local boundary?
8. Are “boundaries” subject to fluctuation? Or, are they unalterably stationary on a universally distributed level?
9. Where is the divine warrant for such universally and unalterably fixed boundaries?
10. Does Rutherford’s reasoning contradict scripture and our standards, or rather sweetly comply with the same on this principle of ecclesiastical government?
11. Is “opportunity” confined to a world inclusive of degrees, or does it exist in a world exclusive of degrees?
12. Is “convenience” confined to a world inclusive of degrees, or does it exist in a world exclusive of degrees?
13. Does an object’s “swelling” or “contracting” (by way of degrees) lose its essential nature in such “motions”?
14. Does the alteration of the condition of a thing necessarily change the essential nature of a thing?

“To their minor we answer, 1. That it is much against their way as ours; All that they can say for the setting out the bounds of Particular Congregations and Elective Synods, will not amount to an express particular rule for all circumstantial variations. All that which they say for the Bounds of a Particular Congregation (in their Reasons against our alleging, Acts 15, for proof of this proposition) is no more but this, such as live so, as conveniently to meet in one place, (which yet perhaps will hardly agree with the bounds of some of their Congregations;) but whether they must be threescore, fourscore, one hundred, two hundred, or a hundred ninety and nine, or more or less; whether they must all live within one mile, two miles, three miles, compass or more or less, or may live twenty, thirty, forty miles, or more a sunder (as is seen in some Congregations now a days) whether a thousand persons should be divided into three or four or five, or more, or

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fewer congregations; and whether this or that man must join himself to this or that, or a third Congregation; what is there in all these particulars, and many more that must determine it, but General Rules of the Word, and principles of Prudence, and the light of Nature, as may best stand with convenience and edification?” - Answer from the Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting brethren concerning diverse congregations being united under one Presbyterial Government, pg. 158

How about James Renwick, when he was establishing the principles necessary to erect a platform of government and discipline in his own day?

“I answer, 1st, Ruling-elders are indeed admitted to respective parishes, in the case and time of a constituted church [a more ordinary & settled state – NS]; but now in the time of this her broken and declining state, there is a moral impossibility of doing it so; For, the most part of the people in the several parishes of the land are either turned avowed and stated enemies unto God, or become such that they will do nothing for God, and have no meddling in such matters: And the want of that accidental circumstance, can no ways warrant us to forbear such necessary duty.”

“2dly, These ruling-elders who now are to be admitted, are to exercise their office over such as elect them; yea, and all such as will submit unto them, which none concurring with the testimony of the day, will refuse. Howbeit, they are particularly and specially tied, to take inspection of that bounds, where they are chosen; and therefore, they are to endeavour to reside there, so far as the troubles of the time may allow.“

“3dly, They are, as to their not being fixed in respective parishes, in the like circumstances with the ministers, who, in this broken state of the church, do officiate to all who employ them; and if this manner be right to them, so it is also to the ruling-elders in the present condition of affairs.” – The Form and Order of the Admission of Elders, James Renwick

“…for, as I say in that place, Presbyterial Churches & Congregational in their being are of divine institution, but in their local bounds, and determinate number of members, they are things of conveniency, of order, and providential necessity, not of divine institution; and the consequence is poor and nothing, for that is a huge mistake of Mr. H. An implicit Covenant is, when professors in practice do that whereby they make themselves to walk in such a society without any verbal profession; for then a sojourning believer partaking in forty churches of the seals in some few years, occasionally doth enter forty implicit covenants, doth forty times unchurch himself, and lose and take up a new Burges-ticket and Church-right, and lose it again: For Mr. Cotton, and the way of the Churches of N.E. teach, That such a man an hundred times partakes of the Seals in some few years, and may lawfully do it, as a son coming occasionally to ten sundry Tables in ten cities or ten families, which do equally belong to his rich and potent father, as he providentially cometh along; yet is he not ten times for that made a son and member of his fathers great family; for his one and same numerical sonship gives him right to all the ten tables: So

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one and the same visibly professed sonship gives so to a sojourning believer the same Church-right to be fed at all the tables, to all Church ordinances in ten hundred visible Churches all the earth over; letters of recommendation do declare, but not create his Church-right to Christ and ten hundred Lords Suppers; and it is a dream, that the practicing and partaking of the Lords Supper gives new combinations and fancied formalities of Membership to all the Churches, whether Congregational or Presbyterial. Say one be necessitated to dwell in his fathers heritage, and must be a member of that Church, What scripture doth loose him from the same occasional duties he owes to the Church from whence he departed, as now being no fixed member thereof?” – A Survey of the Survey, Samuel Rutherford, pg. 113, 114

Questions:

1. Are “things of order and convenience” absolute and universally fixed? Or, are they subject to alteration due to the modifying influence of circumstance? (cf. WCF Ch 1, sec 6).
2. If an absolute moral necessity were injected into an “accidental circumstance,” would such an instance potentially assume the nature of superstition, and as well be marked as an addition to the law of God?
3. If an absolute moral necessity were injected into an “accidental circumstance,” would such an instance evidence a desire of sacrifice over mercy?
4. If an absolute moral necessity were injected into an “accidental circumstance” and others were charged with sin for not assuming the same, would this be an instance of erecting a platform of tyranny over conscience?
5. Would it be utterly hypocritical for an individual to accuse others of tyranny and lording over conscience, while simultaneously promoting merciless principles of Church-government?
6. Would it be utterly ironic and hypocritical for those promoting the notion of “organized society & liberation from tyranny” while simultaneously founding it upon merciless principles of Church-government, and principles that tyrannize over the consciences of God’s people – thus undermining society and establishing chaos?
   
   

Distinction:

1. Things accidental
2. Things substantial

When ordinary instances of government have been appealed to (in support of the present platform of government in the RPNA), those matters of “order and convenience” accidental to such ordinary instances are not what are being emphasized; rather, the substantial principles being drawn from the ordinary rule are being emphasized. These substantial principles are being emphasized in order that they might be applied within an extraordinary context as close to the ordinary rule as possible. This is a critical consideration, and apparently long overlooked by our sophomoric dissenting brethren. The existence of principle is not contingent upon accidentals, but rather is contingent upon the author instituting. Though accidentals may influence the application of principle, they are not essential to the existence of principle. Accidentals are not properly of divine institution. However, it appears that our dissenting brethren have injected such accidentals into the category of things substantial. This can be observed by their continual highlighting of things accidental as if they were substantial (their apparent insistence upon the absolute necessity of a fixed ministry within a local boundary as prerequisite to ecclesiastical government, being one example).

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Example:

“The whole elders of six congregations in a City may all meet in one common Presbytery, without any delegation; and that is Presbyterial Church, as is the meeting of a congregational Eldership.” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 186

Is Rutherford guilty of false analogy here? Obviously not. Rutherford’s comparison of a congregational eldership with a more common eldership is not intended to highlight incidental differences or circumstances arising from providential occasion. Rather, he’s highlighting the nature of the flow of government, and the potential extension of authority within a more common circumstance – especially when congregations are not framed or fixed with ministers, or able to have their own judicial assemblies (cf. 2^nd Book of Discipline, Ch 7, sec 10). Rutherford is placing his emphasis on a thing substantial, not accidental. The nature of proper ecclesiastical government will have essential points of identity when viewed in the context of greater courts, or lesser courts -- in either settled circumstances, or unsettled circumstances. Because of the divine consistency of the flow of judicial authority, the nature of this authority will be one and the same in either the “greater” or “lesser” operations of whatever presbyterial form is in question; it only differs in reference to extension through numerical increase in judicial members.

“…Divines understand by a Church a Presbyterial Church, which they make the measure and pattern of Assemblies” – Samuel Rutherford, Due right of Presbyteries, pg. 322

The degree of “particularization” or “commonality” of authority will expand or contract based upon circumstance:

“We answer, when a multitude of believers, (though many thousands) agreed together in one Presbyterial Government, who had but one only Presbytery [in greater or lesser numerical form – NS], and who probably did all in common, for feeding and governing; they were usually called by the name of one Church: and so it may be still in the like condition. They found it best, in those times of persecution, and public unsettledness, to have one common Treasury for all their poor, and one common Consistory for all matters of censure: But doubtless had the number of believers grown to such a multitude, as that it would have bred confusion to have all their Ecclesiastical Affairs managed in one Court, and took them off from the rest of their work; the light of nature teacheth us to conclude, that they would have had more Consistories than one for Government [if they were available – NS], as well as upon the former increase of believers, they grew to have more meeting places than one for Word and Sacraments, and yet would they have held such a correspondency as matters of difficulty and Common concernment should have been managed by Common consent. But whether all those Congregations growing so numerous, and those Presbyteries thus divided should have been called one Church still; we know not, nor is it of any moment. We say again, We are not inquiring for names and things [but things – NS].” – Answer from the Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting brethren concerning diverse congregations being united under one Presbyterial Government, pg. 10

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Disputes about names, or things?

Many seem to be quite stumbled by a series of supposed “contradictions” built upon semantic arguments:

Objection: How can the elders within the RPNA be a “session” when they are not confined to a local congregation? Historically, the term “session” was used when referencing a single congregation. Because the elders of the RPNA are not ruling in a single congregation, they therefore cannot call themselves a session, and therefore do not have the authority of a session. Therefore, we cannot own them as a session, or a session possessing lawful authority.

Perhaps it would please those asking the question if we simply called them an eldership. The term “eldership” has not historically been confined to single congregations. Or, how about “judicial assembly”? The advancement of semantic arguments when the context calls for essence arguments is weak ground to proceed on. The dispute should not be about names, but rather the essence of things in question. Therefore, whether we call them a session, an eldership, a judicial assembly, a 1965 Chevy, etc., it’s not to the purpose; as one of their own has correctly concluded:

“But not to nitpick, I really could care less about the name ultimately. What matters is the substance."

The Assembly of Divines used the term “consistory” in both common contexts, and more localized contexts:

“They found it best, in those times of persecution, and public unsettledness, to have one common Treasury for all their poor, and one common Consistory for all matters of censure: But doubtless had the number of believers grown to such a multitude, as that it would have bred confusion to have all their Ecclesiastical Affairs managed in one Court, and took them off from the rest of their work; the light of nature teacheth us to conclude, that they would have had more Consistories than one for Government.” – Answer of the Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting brethren, pg. 10

Disputes about names may better aid the spinning of Penelope’s web, but it will not aid the identification of essential issues. Our dissenting brethren seemingly have based their entire inventory of arguments & “questions” on this semantic pillar erected in sand (see their questions/arguments regarding things pertaining to an ordinary & local congregation found in their Independently minded “Charitable Inquiry”). The RPNA is not a local congregation, nor do we assume a 1-1 correspondence with a local congregation. There will be points of identity, but obviously not identity itself. With this held in view, our dissenting brethren have engaged in an obsessive thread of irrelevant theses. If the Lord increases the quantity of ministers and members within our common communion, we’d obviously move more into a settled platform inclusive of multiplied sections of jurisdiction (fixed judicial assemblies within congregations), yet still existing in one common communion. Nevertheless, in our time of public unsettledness, we find it best to have one common treasury, and one common consistory/session/judicial assembly for all matters of censure. But doubtless, if the number of believers within our communion grew to such a multitude, we would hopefully be given the opportunity to form more consistories/elderships/sessions than one for our Government. This of course assumes the Lord would grant us qualified men for the work, for the benefit of

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the whole, not men that are self-pleasing and notoriously of an Independent mindset (obsessive over the parts). We desire leaders that tie our communion together, not fracture our communion in the spirit of Independent isolationism.

Matt 18:20 “Face to face” necessity? Physical “brushing of shoulders” necessity? Or, paradigm for discipline established extending even to ecumenical councils? Logic’s inescapable application

Questions:

1. Where in this text do we find mention of greater judicial assemblies having power of discipline?
2. Do Presbyteries, synods, even ecumenical councils have power of discipline?

We do not see any explicit mention of such assemblies within the text. Nevertheless, the judicial operation of such assemblies is embedded within the text implicitly.

The position of “face to face necessity” unravels Presbyterian Church-government in both ordinary and extraordinary cases; settled or unsettled. Did the Assembly in Acts 15 (when issuing a judicial decree) have to meet “face to face” with every individual that would soon be bound by such a decree? If so, this is a point-blank promotion of Independency, and a condemnation of this historic Assembly. The decree issued by the judicial assembly in Acts extended over brethren who were not present at the meeting; being judicially issued by those who had never seen the faces of those who would be bound by the decree – unless we wish to assume the following:

1. The decree only extended over those present at the meeting itself (which would clearly contradict scripture and our subordinate standards).
2. It only extended to those having access to a local session inclusive of a fixed officer, who would then carry the decree back to the same local congregation. If this were the case, then unbiblical Independency must take the ground, because “whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition” - The Form of Church-Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition). Though the lawfulness of the measure is not denied (formal commissioners sent to Presbyteries or congregations), the absolute necessity of the measure is denied, as it’s not an essential pillar to a Presbyterial Church.
3. Sacrifice should be desired over mercy. A visible congregation in a more desperate condition, lacking an officer (or officers), would therefore lose access to what Christ established in the visible church for its well being (visible sections being fixed or not fixed) – Eph 4: 11-14. Unless of course a congregation’s “visibility” is absolutely contingent upon a fixed ministry? (I hope not)

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Desperation (given this approach) disqualifies the people of God from the blessing of oversight, because “they do not have a fixed ministry”. This is consequential of an Independent form of government, which robs Christ’s flock of its gifts, and implicates an excommunicate status for Christ’s flock due to its desperate condition/absence of local government. This is true ecclesiastical tyranny. Therefore, those who have adopted such a position leading to this conclusion are consequently promoting a position implicative of ecclesiastical tyranny. Every desperate condition does not qualify for every species of measure. Nevertheless, when an agreeable measure can be had, and has being, inclusive of mutual consent, and real interaction, in such a “case” it ought to be strengthened & preserved as close to the rule as possible, not weakened with the hope/intention of elimination:

“Someone mentioned that the elders are aware that people are trying to form a general meeting and disband the session; and that the elders would not have issue with the former but they would have issue with the latter.” – “Effort” communication

“PHASE 3: In the form of a Statement, we tell them to disband, and support our formation of a GM. It will happen, Lord willing, either with or without them – though we prefer with them. OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT.” – “Effort” communication

I fear that some of these brethren would have kicked Renwick off his horse due to his weakened condition, rather than help him onto his horse when help was needed. In this sense (especially given specific instances of timing), our dissenting brethren have played the role of notorious political opportunists.

“Every wise woman buildeth her house: but the foolish plucketh it down with her hands.” -- Prov: 14:1

“Better is a dry morsel, and quietness therewith, than an house full of sacrifices with strife.” -- Prov: 17:1

Nevertheless, given the nature of the “face to face” argument or “brushing shoulders” argument, there could be no settled or unsettled forms of Presbyterian government. The essence of the argument must be equally distributed to the subjects it logically and inescapably applies to:

“It is a wonder that Mr. H should site Whitaker, or any of our Divines, who are all for the power of Presbyteries , Synods, yea of an Oecumenical Councel, from Mat 18, which he himself disclaims as an invention of men.” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survery, Pg 112.

“6 This destroys the communion of Churches as Churches, and makes synods, in which Pastors act as Pastors to other congregations associate, (as Mr. Cotton teacheth) to be no ordinance of Christ” -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 165

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In the settled context of a General Assembly, would such rulings flowing from such an assembly require “face to face” interaction in order to justify the judicial proceeding? The notion is absurd. Those who’ve been ardent opponents of Presbyterian government have argued the latter position in the past:

An Independent’s position:

“Mr. H. To be a member of the Catholic Church firstly to a whole, which a man never did, nor can see, nor do any homage to, nor receive any instruction or direction from for Government, is a sublimated imagination.”

A Presbyterian’s response:

“Ans.This makes the doctrine of Oecumenical councels holden by Calvin, Melanchthon, Luther, Whitaker, and all the learned Divines in the Christian world, to be a sublimated imagination, and Mr. Cotton his associate to be sick of the same imagination; and the decrees, of the Apostles and Elders, Acts 16.4 by which the Churches were established, ver 5, to have no influence of Government upon the Churches.”

“It must be a sublimated imagination, that the whole Churches of Jews and Gentiles, who could not see the faces of all the Apostles [brush shoulders with all the Apostles – NS], nor do any homage to them, nor receive any direction except their writings, which yet may be from them, should be governed by the Apostles; and it must be an imagination, that the Apostles were members of the Catholic integral Churches, and never fixed and married members of the single congregations: and could every one of the ten thousands of the congregational Church of Jerusalem, as our brethren will have it be, be governed by the whole Church, except they had seen the faces [brushed shoulders with – NS] of all the thousands that governed them?” – Samuel Rutheford, A Survey of the Survey, 129, 130

Visible communion: Universal nature of the visible church/basis for external & visible right

1. Membership
2. Government

Mutual duties of membership (unfixed/remote membership or fixed/proper membership) increase or decrease based upon the degree of visible communion existing within historical circumstance.

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Judicial administration in government (fixed or unfixed) increases or decreases based upon the degree of visible communion existing within historical circumstance.

Questions:

1. In order for individuals or congregations to be governed in Jerusalem, is it absolutely essential that congregations have ordinary and regular access to all ordinary instances of blessings flowing from the ministry in order to be governed?
2. Or, could they receive such blessings occasionally, as providence offered opportunity (especially given instances of persecution, being scattered, or a significantly increased quantity of visible converts), yet still exist under a common government by consent?

If the answer is the following “yes, it is essential that individuals and congregations have access to ordinary and regular instances of ruling and feeding in order to be governed,” then this would agree well with Independency. For there to be ordinary and regular access to ruling and feeding from governors within the church, they would have to be ordinarily and regularly fixed to a local congregation. However, “fixedness of ministers and members” is not an essential pillar to the being of a Presbyterial church:

1. Whether the form is to a greater extent (regarding numerical extent of ministers and members)
2. Or lesser extent (regarding numerical extent of ministers and members)

“And whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition.” - The Form of Church Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition)

The proposition assumes an extreme disagreement with the dissenting brethren. The argument is not confined to the context of the greatest judicial assembly (and those governed by it), or the smallest judicial assembly (and those governed by it), but rather applies to all assemblies within the several ranges they may exist (historical circumstances) -- cf. 2^nd Book of discipline Ch 7, sec 10 & Form of Presbyterian Church-Government, pg. 408 (FPP edition). The notion that this reasoning only applies to greater judicial assemblies, implies that mercy can only be applied in the context of greater forms, but excluded from lesser forms. Mercy is not essentially established due to multitude but rather established through faith manifesting in works based upon principle, not properly numbers – Ex 23:2.

Responding to Thomas Hooker’s flawed position on visible communion (which assumed visible communion only existed on local/congregational levels) Samuel Rutherford advances the following biblical/confessional/light of nature position:

“If the faithful scattered in sundry Congregations have an invisible communion only by faith, and so make up an invisible communion, and an invisible mystical body; then two sister-churches that cannot meet in one place, though they may do all the duties of church-

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gaining one another, as Matt. 18 yet are not a visible body, nor their acts, acts of church profession, nor are they visible members of the same body of Christ, because they partake not of the ordinances within the same walls, as do members of the same single congregation: so there is no visible communion, but within the walls of one Church; which is absurd, and repugnant to common sense.”

“2. It is uncharitable, and against the word, to teach, that when a church is dissolved, by no sin and scandal visible, but by persecution or pestilence [or numerous other circumstances – NS], that the dissolved members, though both real and visible converts, have no right to the ordinances: for if the formal cause, to whit, their confederacy into one visible body, as Mr. H saith, be removed, their visible and external right is removed. The like is to be said of visible professors, and of members of another Congregation, and known godly sojourners; these Mr. H excommunicates for no scandal visible and invisible: for impossible it is that they can meet together in one place with their own church, with which only they are incorporate by this confederacy.”—Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 95, 96.

If these dissolved members (dissolved from proper membership local) have right to the ordinances, how can they occasionally receive such ordinances (as the seals) without jurisdiction?

“And how could there be administrating of the seals without any jurisdiction to all to debar the unworthy?” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 250

The universal nature of the visible church allows those who are “sojourners” to partake of the visible communion of the saints, and they certainly have right to the visible ordinances. But if they cannot immediately gain access to these ordinances (which ‘ordinances’ may only be administered by those governors Christ has set in the church) does this mean such sojourners have no right to submit to governors having authority to administer them? If they have a right to submit to such governors’ acts of external administration, then the governors, a priori, have a right to rule over them – which manifestations of feeding and ruling increase or decrease given the circumstances determined by providence. Displacement does not dissolve membership in the visible church, though it may dissolve proper and fixed membership to a particular congregation – but this is purely accidental. Visible communion does not have to be at maximum status in order for visible communion to be identified as “visible communion” -- it exists by way of degrees. Therefore, visible acts of government do not have to be at maximum status in order to be identified as “visible acts of government”. Judicial administration (visible communion on a judicial level) also exists by way of degrees. Visible acts of judicial administration increase or decrease given the circumstances the people of God providentially find themselves. Because providence has left individuals and congregations in a “decreased” status does not mean all power and obligation is removed:

“Secondly, the farther that the members, or Churches either congregational, Presbyterial, or National are removed in local distance, one from another, the less is the visible and external communion of rebuking, comforting, and admonishing one another; yet the power and obligation of these duties are not removed.” – Samuel Rutherford, Due Right of Presbyteries, Pg. 300

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Rutherford is obviously assuming the presence of degrees that exist when explicitly referencing visible acts of communion, yet simultaneously maintaining that judicial power and obligation may co-exist in the fluctuation of such degrees (even certain instances of physical impossibility of local rebukes, blessing, catechizing, etc. which would necessitate written communications – Acts 16). The argument of our modern dissenting brethren squarely contradicts the Presbyterian principle Rutherford applied above. Logically, their position must be the following:

The farther that Churches (either congregational, Presbyterial, or National) are removed in local distance, one from another, visible communion becomes impossible, and should be condemned. Why? Our formal reason is as follows: because they are not within shoulder brushing range. Therefore, the power and obligation of these duties are removed. Visible communion can only exist on local “shoulder brushing” levels.

Questions:

1. Is physical presence the essence of visible communion? Or, is physical presence an ordinary providential measure of convenience implemented to carry out the most essential elements of visible communion in an ordinary context? (An essential component being the flow of communication, and the many duties contingent upon the same).
2. If an essential component of visible communion is communication, is communication confined to the walls of a single congregation, or local boundary?
3. Is a written decree a form of communication? If so, is it a form of visible communion?
4. Does a written decree only bind if the authors can “brush shoulders” with the subjects bound by such a decree? If so, is the warrant for written decrees otherwise undermined?
5. If the warrant for written decrees were otherwise undermined, would this consequently undermine the judicial decree mentioned in Acts 16?
6. If the decree in Acts 16 were undermined due to a “brushing shoulders” argument, would it therefore undermine the system of government judicially issuing the decree?
7. If the system of government issuing the decree mentioned in Acts 16 were undermined, what system of government would then take its place (given the nature of the argument)? Independency, perhaps?

“We answer, (not to dispute how hard it would be for our brethren to prove clearly that distinction of the several names and work of these Elders in Israel; & etc) we inquire not after names, but things: And as for the thing in question, we have already cleared, that the scripture holds out, that as the Church is one, and all the Elders given for the good of that one Church; so their Officers (when orderly called for) should be exercised in any part of it for the good thereof; and that a mutual consent and agreement, is a sufficient warrant and call for the exercise of this power, whether in one Congregation only, as suppose in Cenchrea, or in many, as suppose in Jerusalem, or yet more, as suppose when Antioch and Jerusalem joyned, Act. Chapt. 15 that in any of these, or all of these, they may, and ought, upon such a call, exercise any of their gifts and offices, as the Church, or any part therof shall stand in need.” -- Answer of the Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting Brethren, pg. 8.

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“The state of trying these persons and their seed to be baptized only into the single Body, is a dream, even to Mr. Robinson, and the engagement that gives them right to the Ordinances only with that single Congregation, and in one place, and with no society else to partake of one Bread, and of one Christ, 1 Cor 10: 16, 17, is a scriptureless imagination: for 1 Cor 12: 12, 13 We are baptized all, Jews and Gentiles, by one Spirit into one body, (Catholic, not single Congregation only) and are all made to drink into one Spirit, in the Lord’s Supper, even all; not of one single Congregation only, but of several Congregations, whether they be engaged by Mr. H way or not.” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 96, 97.

Daniel Cawdrey quoting Thomas Hooker, in reference to Hooker’s flawed understanding of the being of the visible Church, says the following:

“Those precious expressions of his, [That all the faithful, whether seemingly or sincerely such, scattered up and down the face of the earth, are but like scattered stones in the streets, or timber filled in the woods, etc. And that they cannot (to common sense) be thought to make up a visible communion, when they are not only severed one from another, but, as in times of persecution, they may be wholly unknown each to other] are unwary and unsafe expressions. For hence it would follow, 1. That the Saints so severed are not members of the visible Church, and so no members of Christ; Or 2. That a man may be a visible Saint, and a member of Christ, and yet no member of the visible Church. 3. It destroys the Church’s being in times of persecution, when the members are scattered one from another. 4. It gives Papists and Sectaries occasion to say, that there hath been no true visible Church (except Rome be one) these many hundred years, because there was no mutual covenanting of Saints, as they require to give it being, till either the Independents but of yesterday, or the Separatists their elder brethren, not much ancienter, entered into such a mutual covenant.” 2 In the assertion itself, there is a general mistake, that he takes the visible Church only for a particular congregation; applying that to it, which primarily belongs to the whole Catholic visible Church.” – Daniel Cawdrey, The Inconsistencies of the Independent Way, pg. 97, 98.

The necessity of “marrying” of members to only one visible congregation is an Independent and scriptureless conceit. The Catholicity of the visible church provides a foundation for visible professors to join themselves together in acts of visible communion – both in reference to mutual duties as members, and mutual duties regarding acts of government. These “engagements” are not always confined to the most settled or advanced forms, but may exist in temporary and unsettled forms. Whether a settled form, or an unsettled form, the universal nature of the visible church establishes the basis for visible communion to function on these levels. “Church duties of warning, teaching, comforting, rebuking, are by no word of Christ restricted to one single congregation”. Though, through providential convenience/necessity, those settled in a single congregation may enjoy all these privileges in a more regular and organized way; sometimes providentially having their own presbyterial assembly local and easily accessible (a local ‘outward form’ of government). This latter consideration is a result of providential convenience regarding the more careful feeding and ruling of those within a more settled/organized circumstance allowing for the same. However, whether a member or minister is fixed to “this” congregation or “that” congregation is accidental, and not so essential in the case when they cannot be fixed to a particular congregation. Within this latter circumstance, do they lose right to Christ’s visible ordinances? Of course not, as they are still members of Christ’s visible church. A collection of professing believers inclusive of officers being “fixed or unfixed” or members being “fixed or unfixed” mutually consenting together as ruling and ruled, qualifies for a Presbyterial church. However, it is necessary that they nearly cohabit to accomplish such duties in an ordinary way, but this is not disputed.

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“1. What difference is there between his tendering of the seals to those of another congregation in his own Church, and in another Church, except the walls of the house make the difference?”

“2. Why should he not tender the other Seal of Regeneration common to all covenanted ones, Acts 2.39, as well as the Lord’s Supper?”

“3. If he may not as a Pastor in another congregation; How, or by what authority of Scripture are Pastors only Ambassadors of the King, Messengers of the Lord of Hosts, Workers with Christ, Stewards, Dispensers of the Mysteries of the Gospel, Sent of God, Friends of the Bridegroom, and can only act as such within the precincts of a congregation; and lose both name and thing, when they pass over the line to visible Saints of another congregation? The Priests might not offer sacrifice and offerings, but in the place that the Lord should appoint in his word; shew us a word confining pastoral acting of Ambassadors to one flock only.

6 This destroys the communion of Churches as Churches, and makes synods, in which Pastors act as Pastors to other congregations associate, (as Mr. Cotton teacheth) to be no ordinance of Christ” -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 164 & 165

An Independent’s position:

“Mr. H. Cohabitation, which is necessary for our Churches, is such as is fit for the end, for the dispensing of Ordinances and Censures where they may conveniently meet, Acts 14.27. 1 Cor 11. 26 & 14.23. it suffers some exceptions. The Church may send out some to begin plantations where they want able guides, until they attain to a Church-state. States may be compelled to send men to Sea for traffique and for war, and yet no prejudice is done to the rule of Christ, they are said to cohabit where the place of their abode is in the issue”

A Presbyterian’s response:

“Ans. If cohabitation be necessary for the attaining the end; then, as the Pastor cannot be a non-resident, by necessity of a calling in Trading, neither can ten godly Merchants be three years absent, as Mr. H says Solomon’s Merchants were, but they must be non-residents, and neglect Church watching, and break Covenant, if it be said (as it must be) is should be the ministers only calling to reside and watch, but the Merchant have and extraordinary calling to trade beside”

“Ans. This confirms us not a little; no godly visible professor can tye themselves by Covenant or Oath to exercise the common Christian acts of a Church-member only to such a society, but in an occasional and providential way: for it is as unlawful to tye Church-worship to one society or place under the New Testament, as it was to tie it of old to Bethel & Gilgal, Hos 4.15 & 9; 12.11 Amos 4.4. which is s demonstration that a godly professor carrieth about a Soul with him stands in need of Church-feeding by the Lord’s Supper, and other Church Ordinances in all the Christian world, and that he is to warn, admonish, comfort all Church members, and to labour to gain a trespassing brother, not of the single congregation only wereof he is a member, Matt 18. And neither Scriptures, nor Sound

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Divinity, nor the Law of Nature (which is not destroyed by the Gospel) will warrant to limit the word, Brother, as Mr. H doth, and his brethren, Matt 18.15 If thy brother trespass, if he hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother; to a brother only of the Congregation of which the offended brother is a member; as if Christ had not set down a rule, Matt 18. of gaining all brethren within the single Congregation, or about it; for the word, Brother, is of this latitude, that it comprehendeth. 1All that may offend a brother, that is, not only within a single Congregation only, of which the brother offended is a member, but also of another Congregation. Now Mr. H. saith, ye have no Church power over one of another Congregation. 2. He is a Brother whom ye are obliged to admonish, Go tell him. 3. He is a Brother whom thou must labour to gain; Thou hast gained thy brother. 4. He is a Brother who is obliged to hear the Church: He will not hear the Church. 5. He is a Brother who may be cast out, Let him be to thee as a heathen. 6. He is one whose sins may be bound in heaven, verse 16, 17. 7. He is a Brother, who if gained, may pray and meet with others in a Church-way in the name of Christ. 8. He is a Brother, who if gained, Christ grants his desire and prayer, verse 19, 20. 9. He is a Brother, who is to be pardoned, If he sin against Peter seventy times seven times, verse 21, 22. 10. He is a Brother, who ought to forgive his fellow- Brother, as he would have God forgive him, verse 14, 25, 35. Now, it were a soul straitening of the word of Christ, to say that these ten agree only to a Brother in order to another Brother of the same Congregation, as if we did owe by Christ’s Doctrine in that notable sermon, Compassion, Forgiveness, Teaching, Gaining, etc. to no Brethren, but to those of the same Congregation, whereof we ourselves are members. “ – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 101-103

Visibility, locality & organization: The highest degree of organization not essential to the being of a Presbyterial Church. Acts 20:28 only applying to a single congregation?

Thomas Hooker against Rutherford:

“If he that is a member of one congregation be a member of all, I cannot see but of necessity it must follow, that one particular Congregation must be another, Ephesus must be Smyrna, and Smyrna must be Thyatira: for where there be the same individual members, there be the same whole integral body; and the ground is undeniable from received rules: Integrum est totum cui partes funt essentia’es. Therefore, the same members carry the same essence to the whole. I assume, there be the same individual members of all the particular Congregations: For if one particular professor be a member of every Congregation, then all particular professors must be so; and so all of the members of one particular Congregation, and so of every one. Hence there being members of every particular Congregation, every particular Congregation is the same: and thence it will follow, that Ephesus is Smyrna, and Smyrna to be Thyatira. Hence when Smyrna is destroyed, yet Smyrna remains.”

Rutherford responds:

“It’s a pity to black paper with such wind-mills. Where there be the same individual members, there must be the same individual whole or totum integral. All the individual members of a man’s body, either similar parts, flesh, and blood, and bones; or organs, eyes, ears, feet, hand, and all the rest taken together, as united, are the whole organical body of man; and so all the Congregations on earth, taken together, are, and make up the whole

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integral Catholic visible Church, existing in all the Kingdoms and States of the earth. But what follows? therefore the hand is the foot, where there be the same proper and nearer fixed members, the thumb and the little finger of the hand, and also the same common and remote members (the same thumb & little finger) of the whole organical body, there is the same integral whole, so as the one member is affirmed of another, the thumb is the little finger, and the little finger is the thumb: for all the organs are members proper, the eyes, ears, nose, of the head, the fingers of the hand, the toes of the feet, and all the rest, arms, legs, belly, shoulders, and all these same members are common and remote members of the whole body: Just as Peter is a fixed and nearer member of this Congregation, and also a common and remoter member of the whole integral Catholic Church. And as all the Citizens of London are fixed and nearer members of London, and proper parts thereof, and yet common and remote members and Subjects of England. Hence Mr. H his own argument, where there be the same individual members, there of necessity must be the same whole integral: So I assume (saith he) But there be the same individual members of all the Congregations. I assume also, John, Richard, Thomas, Citizens of London, of York, are all in their very individual natures, individual subjects of England. Ergo, London must be York, and York must be London, and John Citizen of London, must be Richard, Citizen of York. And contrary. Again, I assume, the same individual thumb, and individual little finger and toes, and individual eyes and ears, are all members of the hand, or congregation of fingers, of the feet and society of toes, & etc. and they are also common members of the whole organical body. Therefore by Mr. H his logic, the thumb must be the little finger; and when the thumb is cut off, the thumb remains. Let Mr. H or any for him, answer Mr. H his Sophism.” -- A Survey of the Survey, pg. 132, 133, 134

Visibility is not contingent upon the highest degree of organization easily accessible on a local level. A man “not fixed” living far off from a congregation, though he is not a proper member of such a congregation is nevertheless a remote member of such a congregation, and as well to all congregations – only being providentially hindered to exercise the same degree of visible acts of communion with such churches given his circumstance. If this applies to one man, then it may apply to two men, or three, or four, or one hundred (unless higher numbers exclude mercy’s application?). Nevertheless, given the nature of the visible church, he is still a visible member, just in a more remote way. Historically, those who have vigorously denied this scriptural assumption were those of the Independent persuasion, who labeled such biblical/common sense principles as “inventions of men”. Mercy cannot be judicially applied given the Independent model. A fixed & local “sacrifice” is rather to be desired by those of such a persuasion repugnant to common sense -- Matt 12:1-8

Thomas Hooker against Rutherford,

“But when congregations are fixed, and they established in peace, and settled with support about them, not more than may comely and comfortably meet together, to partake of all ordinances, should be one church”

Again, Rutherford:

“If the six swarms, which issue out of the numerous Church of Jerusalem, disturb the peace, and make war and division in the church, it is strange. The Eldership or Presbytery over these six swarms, so separated by many miles in divers Colonies, may either meet and exercise discipline, and dispense censures to these six swarms not yet settled, and

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provided with Officers, or they may not meet. To say they may not meet for that end, is to deny that they are under one Presbytery of the same chosen Elders, contrary to what Mr. H said. If they may meet to dispense censures, here shall be ruling Elders & no physical possibility of teaching the swarms so separated as forty miles, they may happily hear of written Decrees, as Acts 16.4 but cannot be edified by preaching. 2.So this Church Congregational which cannot comely and comfortably meet to partake of all ordinances, is no ordinance of Christ, and so no Congregational Church [according to Mr. Hooker – NS]. But such are these swarms that are 40 miles distant ” – A Survey of the survey, pg. 244, 245.

Objection: “Samuel, how can organization exist from a distance? How can there be organization without a local and fixed ministry? The scripture commands ministers to only look over their local flock and to remain a fixed overseer to them alone – Acts 20:28. But you’re extending it beyond the local boundary. You’re promoting prelatic principles of non-residency – and you call yourself a Presbyterian? Samuel, observe the following judicial determination: ‘Thirdly, The pastor and people must so nearly cohabit together, as that they may mutually perform their duties each to other with most conveniency’. You of all people ought to be familiar with the form of Presbyterial Church-government. How could an eldership exercise jurisdiction under such a condition?”

Rutherford’s response:

“Secondly, the farther that the members, or churches either congregational, Presbyterial, or National are removed in local distance, one from another, the less is the visible and external communion of rebuking, comforting, and admonishing one another; yet the power and obligation of these duties are not removed.” -- Due right of Presbyteries, Pg. 300

In reference to the RPNA:

The elders of the RPNA did not argue that they were the proper and particularly fixed elders to each society, but rather argued an explicit general oversight over the societies and individuals consenting to their government. The elders have never argued that they were particular elders (proper and fixed elders) to each scattered society and individual. In this instance, it’s as if our dissenting brethren believe the Assembly at Westminster were condemning us, when in fact they were condemning the Independents (our brethren’s fathers) for asserting an elder had to have a special relation (local/fixed) to each and every congregation in order to rule and feed them -- the absence of that local relation being a hindrance to the function of government.

Renwick responds to the same essential objection our dissenting brethren place so much stock in:

“The first question is: It is usual, that ruling-elders be admitted to respective parishes; but, this admission is not so; therefore, how can it be sustained as lawful?”

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“I answer, 1st, Ruling-elders are indeed admitted to respective parishes, in the case and time of a constituted church [ordinary & more settled state – NS]; but now in the time of this her broken and declining state, there is a moral impossibility of doing it so; For, the most part of the people in the several parishes of the land are either turned avowed and stated enemies unto God, or become such that they will do nothing for God, and have no meddling in such matters: And the want of that accidental circumstance, can no ways warrant us to forbear such necessary duty.” 2dly, These ruling-elders who now are to be admitted, are to exercise their office over such as elect them; yea, and all such as will submit unto them, which none concurring with the testimony of the day, will refuse. Howbeit, they are particularly and specially tied, to take inspection of that bounds, where they are chosen; and therefore, they are to endeavour to reside there, so far as the troubles of the time may allow [assuming (a priori) the troubles of the time may not allow them to reside there, and mutual consent is sufficient – NS]. 3dly, They are, as to their not being fixed in respective parishes, in the like circumstances with the ministers, who, in this broken state of the church, do officiate to all who employ them [whether in a fixed parish or boundary, or not, as it’s all one and the same as to the truth of the proposition – NS]; and if this manner be right to them, so it is also to the ruling-elders in the present condition of affairs.” – The Form and Order of the Admission of Elders, James Renwick.

Acts 20:28

Acts 20:28 should not be interpreted as if it only applied to a single congregation. Oversight is not absolutely tied to a local organization of elders, but as we have seen may apply more broadly. Even in a more settled circumstance, does the organization of higher courts assume an element of oversight regarding all those bound by their judicial determinations? Of course it does, unless we wish to exclude the element of “oversight” from a judicial decree, which is a monstrous display of illogic; implicating the condemnation of a lawful judicial decree recorded in the pages of scripture – Acts 16:4.

An independent’s objection:

“And all these churches must be either his flock, or not: his flock they must be, if he be a Shepherd to them, for that the nature of relatives requires, the combined Churches are many distinct flocks, and he cannot be a pastor of many flocks”

A Presbyterian’s answer:

“This is a mistake of the nature of relatives; for the adequate and complete correlate to which every ordinary pastor is referred as a Shepherd to the flock, as a husband to the wife, actu primo, is all the churches on earth, as a physician is referred to all the sick on earth, not adequately to this one sick person, but actu secundo, in the actual exercises of the ministerial calling, very pastor indeed now is referred to one flock, as a fixed providential feeder, and to these round about, the same way in acts of government that concern associate Churches: but it follows not, as is said, that he is a proper fixed pastor to these Churches round about; for these words, feed the flock which is amongst you, 1 Pet 5:1 & Acts 20:28. Take heed to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you Overseers, Have no such sense as feed the one single congregation only, as a husband to a wife, that is in Ephesus, and beware of the spiritual adultery, of taking pastoral care of the other Churches of Christ that are amongst you. Mr. Cotton saith, the Church in the Canticles (and say I, the pastors also) take care not

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only for her own members, but for her little sister, which she thought had no breasts, Cant 8:8 for they were among them as well as the single congregation. And when Paul saith, take heed to the whole flock, he meaneth not only a single congregation, but divers congregations and many sheep in the flocks of diverse congregations, as signifieth not a few, but exceeding many in Scripture, Phil 2:21, 1 Tim 2:6, Heb 2:9, 1 Tim 2:4, Joh 11:48, Joh 12:32Rev 5:13” – Samuel Rutherford. A Survey of the Survey, pg. 196-198

Distinctions:

1. Settled instances of oversight
2. Unsettled instances of oversight
3. Greater degrees of oversight
4. Lesser degrees of oversight
5. Proper & fixed oversight
6. Common & unfixed oversight

It ought to be noted that Renwick’s formal reasons for admitting of ruling elders in his own time were the following:

1. Acts of government and discipline
2. The perpetuation, and continuation of officers within the house of God:

“III. As to the third, I shall show what moveth us to admit ruling-elders at this time: As,

First, The necessity of such an officer in the house of God: He is institute in the word, and we ought to constitute him; for without him government and discipline cannot be rightly exercised. It was still in a declining time of the church, that this office was little regarded: And because of the singular necessity and usefulness thereof, it has been a great eye-sore to Satan and his instruments: And in former times and cases of the church, like unto this, the admitting of qualified men unto this trust and charge, hath been followed with no small blessing, and success and progress in reformation; which we pray God, may be the consequent of this our action. Secondly, The perpetuation, and continuation of such an officer in the house of God: For, the old, or former elders, are many of them dead, and many of them turned so grossly scandalous, and fallen into such ugly defection, that they have rendered themselves incapable of being continued, or acknowledged as such officers.” – The Form and Order of the Admission of Elders.

If Renwick’s formal reason for admitting ruling elders within his own circumstances was for “government and discipline,” how could such government and discipline exist without jurisdiction? The presence of discipline assumes the presence of jurisdiction, and as well a boundary assuming degrees of extension, a priori:

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“And how could there be administrating of the seals without any jurisdiction to all to debar the unworthy?” -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of a Survey, pg. 250

“And by the church here is not meant any Christian society, nor yet the community or body of the faithful, i.e., the church collective, but the church representative, in the meetings of her teaching and ruling elders; for it is such a church or society as has the power of discipline and government, of binding and loosing—verse 18. Private Christian societies ought therefore to beware of taking upon them to administer rebukes or reproofs to public offenders, (or even in cases where the offence, although originally private, becomes public.) In order to a removal of the scandal, the exercise and application of all church discipline and censures must be left to those with whom Christ has lodged that power.” – Directory for religious societies, pg. 90.

Discipline and government assumes jurisdiction. Jurisdiction assumes a boundary of application. Boundaries of application are not stationary, but may expand or contract according to the circumstance of administration.

Technology & Communication

An essential component of visible communion is communication. Convenience of communication is assumed when “nearness of location” is referenced regarding degrees of accountability existing between churches, ordinarily. The greater distance churches are spread out from one another the lesser degree of visible communion. The greater access of communication between such churches the greater the degree of visible communion. Visible communion is not necessarily eliminated due to geographical limitations (as seen above in reference to Matt 18 & Acts 16:4), though it may be affected by degrees. Again, Rutherford:

“Secondly, the farther that the members, or churches either congregational, Presbyterial, or National are removed in local distance, one from another, the less is the visible and external communion of rebuking, comforting, and admonishing one another; yet the power and obligation of these duties are not removed.” -- Due right of Presbyteries, Pg. 300

Degrees of communication influence the well being of visible communion, not the being of it. In cases when churches or individuals “swarm out” due to whatever circumstance, communication may still be had – either through less advanced means (written communications) or, in our age, through more advanced means (verbal communication via telephony, or electronic communications via internet).

Rutherford, again, assumes precisely the same principle:

“If the six swarms, which issue out of the numerous Church of Jerusalem, disturb the peace, and make war and division in the church, it is strange. The Eldership or Presbytery over

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these six swarms, so separated by many miles in divers Colonies, may either meet and exercise discipline, and dispense censures to these six swarms not yet settled, and provided with Officers, or they may not meet. To say they may not meet for that end, is to deny that they are under one Presbytery of the same chosen Elders, contrary to what Mr. H said. If they may meet to dispense censures, here shall be ruling Elders & no physical possibility of teaching the swarms so separated as forty miles, they may happily hear of written Decrees, as Acts 16.4 but cannot be edified by preaching. 2.So this Church Congregational which cannot comely and comfortably meet to partake of all ordinances, is no ordinance of Christ, and so no Congregational Church [according to Mr. Hooker – NS]. But such are these swarms that are 40 miles distant” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 244

“Mr. H must be forced by his own principles to grant there is one visible Church which cannot meet conveniently in the same place, and yet under the same Eldership” – Samuel Rutherford, marginal note on pg. 244, A Survey of the survey.

In relation to this, as another brother has noted in reference to the essential nature of a court’s meeting:

The essence of a court convening is a meeting of its members to communicate¹ so as to interactively consider, discuss, deliberate, and determine ecclesiastical matters. To do so remotely and in real-time, therefore, necessarily presupposes the existence of technology that is able to facilitate such communication apart from a physical, real presence of its several members together. Telephony, readily deployed, all reasonable persons would view as such an enabling technology to this kind of communication.

If we grant, merely for sake of argument, the consideration of the demand for such an example, as though being a "proof" that is necessary to determine the issue (which we do not grant, but rather assert it to be an erroneous and arbitrary criteria), we must ask, before we further consider:

1. Can those who demand such an example, give us an example of any faithful covenanter minister and ruling elders, or any session of such (excepting ours), that was in existence subsequent to the deployment and ready use of a technology that so enabled real-time communication (even if we stretch it to be sufficiently, widely, and conveniently deployed as early as circa. 1915)²?

If this question cannot be answered affirmatively, apart from the coming into existence of our constituted communion [though not ordinary & settled – NS], then (telephony being granted as that first ready and convenient technology that enabled real-time communication) there cannot be any germane historical possibility for such a demonstration to be made from history as is demanded. The demand and the demonstration must coextend within the period of the enabling technology of such real-time communication that would facilitate remoteness of meeting.

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Otherwise the demand may as well be to "show the lawfulness of a court whose session members use gasoline powered automobiles in order to be brought to a place for the convening of themselves in session", and requiring this to be proved from a period of history before the invention and deployment of automobile transportation. That is, the demand, or captious questions of the same nature, are ludicrously constructed impossibilities devised from erroneous consciences by childish reason -- "reason" that even reaches to the point of inferring the necessity of the mutual, real, and physical presence of the session members with one another in order for them to meet lawfully as a session (as though the flesh of man most profiteth such meetings -- as though man's material body is the primary essence of man, or that such a bodily presence is that without which man cannot sufficiently communicate to others of his race). May God send us better reasoners than this.

2) Or, do those dissenting brethren who so bravely demand such an example, even demand us to give it from the times of the Westminster Assembly, wherein no such ready technology that enabled real-time communication existed? We doubt their folly extends this far, else they deny the reality of history as being such, and the providence of God in the progressive development of technology for common use in such history as is ever unfolding. But, perhaps, we grant our dissenting brethren too much benefit of the doubt, as their faith must, it seems, be acted upon visibles, not virtuals (such virtuals as things like circumstantially transcendent principles of truth, promises unseen, etc).



¹ Real-time communication is assumed. However, we grant the possibility that parts of communication may be done in non real-time (such as to obtain the suffrage of an absent court member (cp. 1 Cor. 5), etc.); but we view mutual discussion and deliberation by such non real-time means (e.g. as snail mail) to so introduce inordinate time delays in such discussions and determinations as to cumulatively render the judicial process to be intolerably delayed and cumbersome (even when between two individuals, let alone three or more) -- being an accidence of this mode of communication that itself introduces an inordinate protraction into the judicial process unto determination; and so, by the employment of even this indifferent mode of communication, its introduction and use would likely render, in-and-of itself, judicial timeliness (and therefore actual judicial acting) impossible. Moreover, this non real-time mode reduces, by degree, the officer's sense of the concerted action of the court in the inability for them to hear their mutual voices and opinions in real-time. Therefore, why introduce such a diminution of the sense of the officers concerted acting and, even a more significant deterrent, the evident likelihood of the impossibility of actual judicial acting?

² We recognize the invention of the telephone dates from circa. 1876, and that there were some regional trials of telephone exchanges as early as circa 1878. Nonetheless, the total number of telephones deployed in the entire United States by 1880 was only about 48,000. If we grant an assumption of about 10 million households (cp. 1890 census), this means that there was only 1 telephone for every 208 households in the United States, or about 1

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telephone for every 1250 people. The first transcontinental service and call was made in 1915. In 1918 it took an average of 15 minutes to be connected to a long distance connection. In 1910, even in densely populated areas (e.g. New Jersey) there was only 1 telephone in every 49 homes. By 1920 only 1/3 of homes in the US had telephone service. The point being this: telephony was hardly a widely adopted and deployed technology that was convenient to most persons until much, much later than even the 1920s, and some might say later than the 1940s. Moreover, most household connections, even as late as the 1940s, were party lines; and, there was no multi-way calling technology available until decades later. These things alone would make its use non-viable for either confidential or group communications until the technology for unshared lines and multi-way calling was made commonly available and readily adopted decades later.

End quote

“This is most clear in the continual intercourse held in the Churches of the New Testament betwixt several Churches or Congregations, with one another [fixed or unfixed – NS], even while they enjoyed the personal presence, direction and authority of the Apostles, 2 Corinthians Chapter 8. Verse 16. Acts Chapter 15. Verse 26. Colossians Chapter 4 verse 16. Acts Chapter 1 verse 29, 30. Galatians Chapter 6. Verse1, 2, 5, 9 with Galatians Chapter 1. Verse 2. Acts Chapter 13. Verse 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Acts Chapter 15. Verse 1, 3, 4. Sometimes by letters written to many Churches as one body, sometimes by commissioners, sometimes by Synods, sometimes in a particular matter concerning one Church, sometimes in matter of common concernment to many Churches…” -- Answer of the Assembly of Divines to the dissenting brethren against the proposition of divers Congregations being united under one Presbyterial Government, pg. 7 & 8

Communication: The process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or behavior (Webster’s Collegiate)

Deliberate: to think about or discuss issues and decisions carefully. To think about deliberately and often with formal discussion before reaching a decision (Webster’s Collegiate)

Deliberation: 1 a: the act of deliberating b: a decision and consideration by a group of persons of the reasons for and against a measure. 2: the quality or state of being deliberate. (Webster’s Collegiate)

Our dissenting brethren have denied communication and deliberation through telephony to be a lawful form when determining judicial matters. If our brethren’s argument were sound, they would have to first establish proof that the essence of communication is not found in the use of telephony, and as well that physical presence is absolutely essential to communication and deliberation. I have not personally observed an argument that established proof of the same, only instances based more upon subjectivity, rather than objectivity. If the essence of the thing in question is one and the same (communication and deliberation), and essentially accomplished the same ends that would be found within an ordinary context, upon what basis would such a measure be determined as unlawful?

“But this difference of the times being (as it ought to be) admitted, for an inevitable cause of the differences of the former, both those two forms of presbyterial meetings appointed by the church of Scotland do not only necessarily result from that one apostolic form, but likewise (the actions of them both being laid together) do accomplish all these ordinary

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ecclesiastical functions which were by it performed“ George Gillespie, English Popish Ceremonies, pg. 357

Our dissenting brethren must first prove that mutual discussion and careful deliberation on a formal/judicial level, to the end that a decision might be reached, cannot be performed or accomplished using telephonic means. They must also prove that a telephonic approach, on an essential level, does not accomplish what would be accomplished in the case when individuals were physically present within the same room.

The only alternative would have to lie on an expediential level (unwarranted due to circumstance, not essence). If the argument runs toward expediential warrant, then criteria for “inexpedience” must be provided and squared with principles of mercy, and whether expediential warrant is based upon the highest degree of visible communion found within an ordinary circumstance, or if there may be degrees of difference. On the government/membership interaction level, even within ordinary circumstances judicial processes have been delayed due to an influx of visible members joining a local congregation. Should the eldership disband in this circumstance? Should they simply abandon the sheep to wolves? Of course the elders should move towards building the government to accommodate the influx of members (as they are able), but this is obviously not always so immediate. What about in the case when none are qualified? Should an eldership move rashly in ordination? Is a bare desire flowing from individuals to pursue the ministry sufficient in itself to qualify for ordination? Is there a universally set timeframe regarding accountability for ministers to ordain individuals to office? Or, does circumstance determine based upon providence evidencing qualification on a preceptive level -- Mt 7:16, 1Tm 5:22, Rom 8:28?

Technology obviously does not replace government, but rather allows government to function more efficiently and effectively. There’s an obvious distinction between government, and the tools implemented within the operation of government. This (in essence) is no different than the Apostles’ use of any form of organized communication, and any device enhancing the same (technology in seed form). To assume the implementation of technology (to the end that visible communion might be enhanced) is the equivalent of some “modern day monument of idolatry” is yet another knee jerk wonder in the world of illogic -- deserving a distinct mark on an ever-increasing list of modern day absurdities. It also seems to have a trace of Gnostic heresy: why would one consider the implementation of created things as necessary evils? If this is not the argument, then why condemn the lawful use of such technology? Technology enhances degrees of access to visible communion. Why? Because technology enhances communication. An enhancement of communication equals an enhancement of visible communion. An enhancement of visible communion equals greater access to judicial administration. Greater access to judicial administration equals a broadened opportunity to serve on the judicial level. A broadened opportunity to serve on the judicial level equals something we should be thankful for, not bitter against – Eph 4: 11-14.

This being the case (on the judicial level), it certainly may apply on the membership level (especially within our own circumstances). A correspondence meeting via conference call (or in person if providence allows) would be a fine method of engaging the visible communion of the saints. We could mutually encourage one another in a common way, seeing as we’re so extremely separated by many miles (thousands even). Nevertheless, because every portion of a river is not immediately visible (government or membership) given the limited span of an individual’s eye, this does not mean that the whole river is not visible – at least not for those of the Presbyterian persuasion.

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Borrowed capital/Special pleading

Those that are of the opinion that it’s necessary to undermine the present government and establish a general meeting in its place cross their own principles, and as well operate upon borrowed capital. Where within our historical testimony was there ever a general meeting via telephone conference? On the one hand (general meeting), technology is apparently assumed in order to more efficiently/effectively carry out a meeting inclusive of visible acts of communion. Technology is obviously used here due to the vast distance existing between the societies that would be involved in such a meeting (for those that agree that such a meeting may take place via conference call). On the other hand (ecclesiastical government), technology is denied to be a sufficient measure taken for the efficient/effective engagement of visible communion, and “vast distance” is asserted as an absolute hindrance to the function of the same. How is this not utterly arbitrary? Our dissenting brethren will insist that visible communion in government be cut off even though an essential element of visible communion – communication – is readily available, rather than preserve the being of such communion in government. On the other hand, while they deny the warrant for visible communion on a government level (due to the absence of locality regarding elders and members), these poor brethren arbitrarily apply the same technological method amongst themselves (phone meetings with rules of governing – acts of visible communion, albeit grossly conspiratorial in their case). If illogic were brilliant, thinking of this nature would shine brightly.

Some will perhaps attempt to establish a distinction between the two types of meetings (judicial and non-judicial) in the vain hope of escaping a glaring instance of special pleading. Nevertheless, both meetings assume the presence of the following:

2. Visible acts of communion
3. Vast distance between the members of the meeting (completely outside of ‘shoulder brushing’ range’)
4. Measures taken that are influential to the lives of those being represented, or governed
5. An element of newness/difference in the implementation of technology to carry out visible acts of communion
6. An application of general principles accommodated to a differing set of historical circumstances.
7. An assumption that such a practice does not, by any necessity, have to be in 1-1 correspondence with former applications of the same in history past.

Among other differences that may exist, the most important one (mentioned above) would be the nature of the meetings: one is judicial, the other is non-judicial. I fail to see how this distinction would justify allowing for the use of technology in the one case, yet not in the other. If such a distinction were used to justify this apparent assessment, it would implicate the following position:

1. Efficient and effective communication (conducive to preservation) should be included in a non-judicial context (which is reasonable and true).
2. Yet, efficient and effective communication (conducive to preservation) should be excluded in a judicial context (which is utterly arbitrary and false).

This is strange logic; it’s as if those posing such an argument leading to such a conclusion would argue anything to get themselves out of the hands of all government itself -- even plunging into the grossest and most fallacious distinctions…all this in agreement with our testimony? My faith can’t reach it. The argument screams the presence of an intense axe to grind. If this fallacious reasoning were true, even an eldership ruling in a town could not use technology to communicate about matters pertaining to

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ecclesiastical jurisdiction wherein actual rulings are determined. If this were true, then they would necessarily have to be physically present within the same room in order for such judicial rulings to be ecclesiastically binding upon those within their jurisdiction – all when the essence of the judicial conclusion would be one and the same via a simple phone call. Have those who have promoted such “thinking” drawn such principles from universal and absolute laws of logic? If so, then logic is illogic: welcome to the world of arbitrary folly -- a blood relative to principles found in a world of absolute randomness.

For those that may deny the legitimacy of a correspondence meeting from remote locations:

Upon what grounds would it be denied? If you have access to communication (though it may not be the highest and most ordinary/intimate quality of communication), why would you reject the opportunity to avail yourselves of it? Could it possibly be an attempt to be consistent with a flawed position of visible communion in membership & government? Is visible communion absolutely confined to local levels? Or, perhaps the visible church is not so universal after all? Choose wisely.

Correspondence meeting

In reference to a meeting of this nature (and fellowship meetings in general), it must be noted that such a meeting should be governed by biblical principles:

"…and, upon the other part, that, under the name and pretext of religious exercises, no such meetings or practices be allowed, as are apt to breed error, scandal, schism, contempt, or misregard of the public ordinances and ministers, or neglect of the duties of particular callings, or such other evils as are the works, not of the Spirit, but of the flesh, and are contrary to truth and peace" - Directory for Family worship, pg. 422, sec 14.

This agrees well with the directory for religious societies:

"Religious societies ought to be cautious and wary whom they take into their communion in this way. Every one is not fit for it. The very natural temper of some Christians, that perhaps cannot be excluded from communion otherwise [public worship – NS], unfits for this kind of society. The churlish and contentious proud, Diotrephes-like tempers, loving to have the lead and pre-eminence in place of yielding that dutiful subjection which is required of Christians one towards another, will be found troublesome and dangerous members. There are those whom the Apostle calls evil surmises – Tim 6: 4 – who being taken into social meetings, never fail to give them trouble. These are persons of weak, jealous and suspicious minds, always ready to imagine and construe the worst of the words and actions of their brethren” - Directory for religious societies, pg. 49, 50.

Note the perfect harmony (in principle) between the "Directory for Religious Societies" and the "Directory for Family worship."

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Qualities that undermine the being of a lawful meeting of this nature:

1. Error
2. Scandal
3. Schism
4. Contempt, or misregard of the public ordinances and ministers
5. Neglect of the duties of particular callings
6. Other evils as are the works, not of the Spirit, but of the flesh, and are contrary to truth and peace
7. "Diotrephes-like temper," collectively loving to have the lead and pre-eminence
8. Evil surmises
9. Jealousy
10. Evil Suspicion
11. Conspiracy

If individuals are not to be admitted into fellowship meetings due to such dangerous qualities, should individuals seek to join meetings that collectively assume such qualities? It has been judicially determined that one is not permitted to participate in such meetings (see directory for Family worship above). Note also that the principle displayed in this section is obviously not confined to family worship, but extends to all fellowship meetings in general. Persons joined together in a "meeting" assuming these qualities do not make up a "lawful meeting," but rather one that is to be avoided. The existence or non-existence of church censure is irrelevant to the truth of the proposition (though church censure would judicially reinforce/conclude the warrant to avoid those forming a meeting of this nature, in the case such a meeting assumed the qualities noted above; in this sense, it's highly relevant).

Attending meetings that assume the qualities of schism is a creation/perpetuation of Schism, being forbidden by the word of God, and our subordinate standards.

Avoiding meetings that assume the qualities of schism is an act of avoiding schism, being commanded by the word of God, and our subordinate standards.

Public worship contexts: all are commanded to come and hear the public preaching of the word – whether excommunicated, or not. The public preaching/hearing of the gospel is of a remedial nature (all-inclusive) – except in such cases of those notoriously/obstinately disturbing the public order.

Erastus:

“The church is a draw net, a field, a marriage Supper, there be good and ill in it, and it was not the sin of the inviters, who are bidden invite all good and bad, Matt 22. But the man that came himself, without the wedding garment, he is cast into utter darkness: Ergo, the officers are to invite all, and exclude none”

Rutherford answers:

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“Ans. They are to invite all, to all Ordinances, and Seals, even Dogs and Swine, that is false: They are to invite all to some Ordinances; to hear the Law and Gospel preached, but the Seals, that were to cast Pearls to Swine” -- The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication, pg. 281

“But seeing the excommunicated person is not excluded from hearing the word, and the pastor hath a pastoral care of his soul, and is to intend that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord, 1 Cor 5:5 he cannot utterly be cut off from Church-fellowship. Also this author (a) saith, that the Church-members are to be admonished, and if we do it not, we hate them in our heart, Levit 19:17. And and if we warn not an Achan, is sin is the sin of all Israel. Now, if an excommunicated brother remain one, whom we are to gain, and whose salvation we are to intend, if he be an ordinary coworshipper in hearing, the object of pastoral and brotherly teaching and admonishing, he cannot be wholly excluded from all Church-fellowship.” – Samuel Rutherford, Due Right of Presbyteries, pg. 274

Society

In order for societal order to function correctly within any circumstance, it must be applied in accordance with Presbyterian principle, not founded on pure and unadulterated Independency/Sectarianism. Society must also never be based on abusive principles of historical interpretation. Society must also never be abused to conspiracy – however loudly it may be cried out “in the name of society!” The directory for religious societies explicitly warns against such and would never sanction a principle of conspiracy geared to overthrow an existing/faithful presbyterial assembly ruling in common.

"Human society, or, communion and intercourse with his fellow-creatures, in the way subordination to the other. All human society, unions and friendship, must ever be considered as subordinated to divine society, otherwise they cannot deserve the name society but of conspiracy. This human society consists in the reciprocal performance of all offices and duties of that natural benevolence, love and helpfulness which the divine law requires between man and man " – Directory for religious societies, pg 10.

Such a principle of conspiracy has consequently fractured the degree of order already existing in our societies (albeit our ‘order’ has been somewhat on an informal level). We have not been without all order, but we’re now plunged into a fractured state of disorder by those crying “society” and “general meeting”. Those who’ve personally discussed this issue with me in the past know that the organization of society has never been an issue; rather, the issue has been,

1. The abuse of the practice itself (conspiracy established using ‘organized society’ as a vehicle -- apparently flowing from extreme ambitions to leadership)
2. Unbiblical positions of Church-government.

Distinction:

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1. The use of a thing
2. The abuse of thing

Forcefully insisting on notching up the organization of visible communion under our current circumstances is not in keeping with good order. Such an attempt even reached levels of attempting to unravel a common eldership existing among a few select societies and isolated individuals/families. We have not been without all order, for the record. Nevertheless, given this nearly obsessive insistence upon formality, we are now plunged into disorder – all in the name of promoting order? And society? Intention and effect often collide. Such societal structures must be agreed upon by consent, not obtrusion implemented through the conduit of conspiracy, and an additional attempt to establish a court of public opinion erected against a common government – being spawned from a platform of evident conspiracy and essential Indepenency. Conspiracy and Independency cannot lead to order in the end – the two platforms combined function as a recipe for ecclesiastical ruin.

Distinction:

1. Formal
2. Informal

We have been somewhat informal to date (regarding the activity of our societies): informal, yet without chaos. Formality can be very useful as it helps to establish organization. Formality obtruded, however, is not preservative of good order, but inhibitive of good order, and a gateway to disorder. Disorganization not only corrupts engagements on a more broad level, but also on a more local level. Families will suffer at the hands of revolutionary schemes apparently spawned from conspiratorial methods & extreme ambitions to leadership (you know who you are).

Bifurcation/circumstantial levels of mutual duty

The following assumption is a false dilemma:

“It’s either members of a society or members of a larger communion.”

Individuals are both members of individual congregations (fixed or unfixed), and also the greater communion as a whole: an individual is both a member of a visible communion in part, and also a member of a greater visible communion in whole. Though this is the case, it should not be assumed that an individual’s membership under these two considerations is identical in every respect. An individual’s interest is providentially determined given the place of his residence, which should be considered a section of the greater visible body.

Distinctions:

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1. Fixed member (providentially residing with comely and comfortable partaking of all the ordinances )
2. Remote member (providentially isolated without comely and comfortable access to all the ordinances)
3. Fixed and remote members of the church in whole.

These distinctions rest upon the biblical doctrine of the Catholic or Universal nature of the Visible Church. Whether a proper fixed member, or a remote member, he nevertheless is a member of the visible body – at least for those of the Presbyterian persuasion. The visible church exists under various conditions (cf WCF Ch 25, sec 4 & 5). Providence in many cases determines an individual to have no fixed or local membership. Though this may be the case, he still has right to the visible ordinances because he is still a visible member of the greater body, though he may not be a fixed/local member.

Fixed or unfixed members may all be underneath a common government.

They may be,

1. Members of there individual congregations (fixed or not fixed)
2. Members of a more common “membership” consisting of a common government ruling over them – no different than in a more settled state of the church, when membership is inclusive of both a local congregation, and the more broad “denomination” or “national church” such a local congregation resides within (being greater and lesser sections in the universal visible Church).

To deny this distinction is to assume a principle of Independency, which consequently:

1. Denies the truth of visible communion existing throughout all churches corporately considered
2. Isolates visible communion exclusively to local levels.

Visible communion is not confined to local congregations (fixed or not fixed with government), but extends more broadly within degrees:

Example: an unsettled common eldership context:

1) The existence of a common eldership

2) The non-existence of a common eldership

1. The existence of a common eldership with an informal correspondence: informal fellowship throughout the body, applying the basic commandments of mutual Christian accountability on an informal level as providence allows and as God’s law commands.

b) The existence of a common eldership with a more organized or formal correspondence within the body: applying the basic commandments of mutual Christian accountability on a more organized level.

c) The non-existence of an eldership with an informal correspondence: Christians, without a formal element of organization, meeting together to apply mutual Christian duties that exist prior to any formal

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union (pending consent of the whole to create a more formal union by formal consent, if consent can be had).

d) The non-existence of an eldership with a formal general meeting agreed upon by formal consent: uniting the existing societies into one formal general meeting.

Mutual Christian duties are not contingent upon higher degrees of formality. A higher degree of formality may better aid the accomplishment of these duties under specific circumstances, though it is not absolutely essential to them.

Question: Before there were ever an agreement among societies to join into one formal meeting by formal consent, were there pre-existing mutual Christian duties of edification between such societies or individuals (as occasion permitted)?

There certainly were, as formal consent is not essential to the existence or accomplishment of such pre-existing duties flowing from the moral law. To deny this would be to usher antinomianism into the “camp” of God’s people (moral duty is not contingent upon formalities). Congregations, fixed or not fixed, may own a common form of government ruling over them, and as well have non-judicial correspondence meetings for their mutual edification, instruction, etc, though not being autonomous to the inspection of a common government (if one exists). Mutual consent is a sufficient warrant regarding such an organization’s operation on each of these levels (common government & formal correspondence). Such a common government may be extraordinarily established, and in standing use, though not always acting. In this respect, it’s no different than a local assembly of elders: just because they are not continuously acting does not mean there is not a standing local government:

“The whole elders of six congregations in a City may all meet in one common Presbytery, without any delegation; and that is Presbyterial Church, as is the meeting of a congregational Eldership” – A Survey of the survey, pg. 186

Bifurcation (false dilemma fallacy): Reasoning which is faulty due to a false disjunctive premise. Considering a distinction or classification exclusive and exhaustive when other alternatives exist.

What determines “access”?

In my estimation, access to government is not to be taken absolutely, but again depends on the circumstance:

1. If the government can conveniently be had (see above questions regarding ‘convenience’ and the implications of the questions threaded throughout the body of this communication).
2. If the being of the government is already in existence.
3. If the consent of the people (formal or tacit) has been received in reference to the common judicial inspection flowing from such a government (SR, Survey, pg. 123 together with pg. 185, 186, 245, 246).
4. If visible communion provides the basis for access in reference to 1-3.

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What determines convenience?

Distinction

1. Greater degrees of convenience
2. Lesser degrees of convenience

The greatest and most settled instance of convenience is not a criterion for whether or not something “less convenient” may be lawful or expedient. Lesser instances of convenience have always existed in the church to one degree or another. Did the Apostles and elders in Acts start off with the most convenient and settled form? Did they start off with fixed congregations throughout the land given the several thousands of visible converts? Our subordinate standard (assuming principles of common sense) assumed not:

“The several congregations in Jerusalem being one church, the elders of the church are mentioned as meeting together for acts of government; which proves that those several congregations were under one presbyterial government. And whether these congregations were fixed or not fixed, in regard of officers or members, it is all one as to the truth of the proposition. Nor doth there appear any material difference betwixt the several congregations in Jerusalem, and the many congregations now in the ordinary condition of the church, as to the point of fixedness required of officers or members” – The Form of Church-Government, pg 408

There’s a two-fold assumption present within this judicial determination:

1. Circumstance
2. Principle

Regarding circumstance: it’s obvious that those framing our subordinate document assumed that many churches in Jerusalem would not likely be fixed with a ministry given the existence of several thousands of visible converts during the time. Supply and demand of ministers does not always work out evenly, else the assumption within the form of government is superfluous/vaporous, having no reference point/avenue of application.

Regarding principle: it’s obvious that whether ministers or members were fixed or not fixed, it was one and the same in reference to the truth of the proposition. What proposition? Ministers or members, whether fixed or unfixed, could all make up a presbyterial church. The assembly that framed this scriptural truth into our subordinate document assumed this to be the case when dismembering the unscriptural position of the Independents:

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Observe the thread of reason in succession below:

"There must be many elders appropriated to these congregations, which have power over their own only (saith he) and not over others. That we deny. I should say, any other than save this worthy man, (whom I muched loved and ever honored) who would write a book against Presbyterian government, and yet did not understand the constituent elements of a presbyterial church, deserves to be censured; for Mr. H yieldeth all the Presbyterial church that MR. R. pleads for, or that the famous Synod as Westminister desire, where there were eminently learned men , who well understood Presbyterial government, and all adversaries thereof…see the Assembly of Divines to the seven dissenting Brethren, An. 1644. Suppose in Jerusalem (saith the Synod) there were ten congregations, and twenty officers, feeding and ruling them in common, not one of them fixed to any single congregation. This kind of Presbytery would pass for a lawful government:" A Survey of a Survery of that Summe of Church Discipline, Samuel Rutherford. Pg. 245, 246.

"Mr. H being to evert Presbyterian Government, he begins at the pillars.The Presbyterian Church consists of three pillars. There must be several congregations, made entire of such members to make up an integral body of rulers and ruled. Ans. There is a crack in this pillar, it is not essential to a Presbyterian Church that all the congregation be entire, and formed churches, having their own officers distinct from the offices of others, we cannot determine that Matthias had a determinate flock, to which only he was a fixed pastor; and Peter another, and John a third, we rather judge the whole twelve fed in common, sometimes in one congregation, in this house, daily, and sometimes in another; but all the huge thousands could not feed in one house, otherwise many congregations framed and fixed, or not framed and fixed, are all under one Presbytery, as the learned and reverend Assembly at Westminster teacheth. If the pillars be dreams, the house that Mr. H. storms is also a dream" -- A Survey of a Survey of that Summe of Church Discipline, Samuel Rutherford. Pg. 185, 186.

“If the six swarms, which issue out of the numerous Church of Jerusalem, disturb the peace, and make war and division in the church, it is strange. The Eldership or Presbytery over these six swarms, so separated by many miles in divers Colonies, may either meet and exercise discipline, and dispense censures to these six swarms not yet settled, and provided with Officers, or they may not meet. To say they may not meet for that end, is to deny that they are under one Presbytery of the same chosen Elders, contrary to what Mr. H said. If they may meet to dispense censures, here shall be ruling Elders & no physical possibility of teaching the swarms so separated as forty miles, they may happily hear of written Decrees, as Acts 16.4 but cannot be edified by preaching. 2.So this Church Congregational which cannot comely and comfortably meet to partake of all ordinances, is no ordinance of Christ, and so no Congregational Church [according to Mr. Hooker – NS]. But such are these swarms that are 40 miles distant” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 244

Questions:

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1. Would it be biblical/Presbyterian to condemn the Apostles and elders of applying a form of government that did not have the highest degree of convenience, when due to circumstance they likely (obviously) could not supply a fixed ministry and/or government to every particular congregation?
2. Given the several thousands of visible converts within that time, should the Apostles and elders have packed their bags and called it quits because they could not immediately provide the highest form of a settled and organized Presbyterian church, and therefore command the people as follows: “govern yourselves in a non-judicial way”?
3. Because every congregation may not have had their own “formal sessions,” did this therefore mean they were without all “outward form” of government?

The notions are repugnant to scripture, and common sense.

Certain instances of physical impossibility do not necessarily undermine the warrant for a Presbyterial church: Independent accusations of Prelacy & multiplied instances of supposed incongruities (spinning Penelope’s web)

Accusations of “prelacy” & “popery” have been circulated within (and without) our communion as of late. The Independents were happy to launch the same confused accusations at the Presbyterians over three hundred years ago:

An Independent’s position:

“Mr. H. Arg 2 If the Presbyterian ministers have jurisdiction, then, over all the churches of the combination, or only over some; not over some only, for that is against the definition of a Presbyterian Church: Therefore they must have jurisdiction over all the Churches, ten or sixteen. If they have jurisdiction over all these, then they are officers, pastors, Teachers, Ruling Elders in office to them all; for there must be an office, and so officers before jurisdiction; and there is no jurisdiction exercised but by an officer. To say they are Pastors of them all, is to make a road and ready way for Pluralities, Non-Residencies.”

A Presbyterian’s position:

“Mr. Hooker gives us, as also the Dissenting Brethren in the Assembly at Westminster did, instead of scripture, a number of supposed incongruities [nearly a 1-1 correspondence with the modern dissenting Brethren recently disowning/denying the existence of our government – NS], which with equal weight fall upon their own way, as upon ours. For suppose that the twelve Apostles [what if it were three Apostles? – NS], Act 2. & 4. & 6. For divers years were Pastors to the many thousands that made up divers, eight or ten congregations, who daily convened from house to house, Act. 4.46 & 5.42 in Jerusalem; and

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that all the twelve fed all these ten congregations in common, Matthias not being a fixed Pastor to this congregation more than to this; nor Peter a fixed Pastor to this flock rather than to this, which is a thing most ordinary in great Cities, where there be 12 flocks, and 24 Pastors, and variety of gifts by interchange, proves more edifying. All the Pastors have jurisdiction, yeah and Pastoral charge over every one of the twelve. Then 2. Must they be Pastors and Teachers to every one of the twelve, and because all the 24 cannot every one of them be residents and dwellers in all and every congregation of the ten or twelve churches in Jerusalem, (that is physically impossible) here shall be Pluralities and Non-residents, and that which our Brethren call Diocesan Prelates here.”

“2. That the Presbyterial preachers be pastors and teachers, habitum, and actu primo, and in common to all the Churches of the combination, in acts of common concernment, though they be not actu secundo, actual laborers, proper and fixed pastors, residents and dwellers in every congregation (for that was physically impossible to the Elders of Jerusalem) to all and every congregation, is not absurd, but necessary; and the charge of Pluralities, and Prelatical Non-residents, follows by no logic, except you call the twelve Apostles, who preached fixedly at Jerusalem some years, Non-residents, because that they could not every one of them dwell in every family of so many thousands at once: In which sense, multitudes of Independent ministers shall be Non-residents; and suppose there shall be a common Treasury to pay the laborers their wages, and that collected out of the goods of all the thousands so combined, the Independent Ministers upon the same account must be Pluralists, and receive wages from many, to whom they neither are nor can be fixed, and proper and peculiar feeding pastors.” -- Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Survey, pg. 191, 192

Our current format (RPNA)

We are not currently in a situation inclusive of several thousands of visible converts being added to our communion. We presently have close to the smallest Presbyterial form sustaining a court ruling in common over a few select societies and isolated families/individuals by mutual consent. The differences within our circumstances compared to that of Jerusalem are the following:

1. Spatial relation (geographical location)
2. Quantity of officers
3. Quantity of members
4. A significant increase in communication enhancement

Spatial relation among members and ministers (boundaries of jurisdiction) is circumstantial, being subject to fluctuation, and should not be judged based upon the greatest and most ideal circumstance (an ordinary circumstance of nearness of cohabitation). Spatial relation may influence degrees of visible communion, but not visible communion essentially considered. Spatial considerations should be gauged according to providential convenience (see threads of thought above). Quantity of officers is also circumstantial, and not of a moral nature (except when referring to the necessity of plurality when forming a court). Quantity of members is also circumstantial, and not of a moral nature. The enhancement of communication equals the enhancement of opportunity. Communication enhancement will likely be witnessed most vividly during the millennial period.

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Q. Should societies move into greater degrees of organization?

A. Sure, as long as such organizational increases are done decently and orderly, according to Presbyterian principle/common sense principles – exclusive of conspiracy, Independency and obsessive ambition.

Q. Is it lawful to slow down the erection of a more organized societal platform in cases of those seeking to abuse the temporary provision to Independency and conspiracy?

A. Of course, as a thing’s use is only as good as it is not abused.

Q. Do greater degrees of organization necessarily presuppose the non-existence of degrees of organization preceding the instance of organizational advancement?

A. No; the assumption doesn’t follow. The greater degree of a thing would rather assume the pre-existence of a lesser degree, a priori. This applies to the both membership, and government.

Q. What if the church multiplies into the thousands? How will the elders handle this?

A. The elders obviously wouldn’t be able to handle such an enormous workload in an ordinary way; such is physically impossible. Given their limited capacities, they should do what they can if they receive the call. But given this enormous influx of visible converts, odds are there would soon be qualified men to ordain as elders – which unfortunately is an element severely lacking in our own day (Matt 7:20).

“Essential questions” from our modern dissenting brethren

_ If we are re-structuring, then what is our current

structure?

A common government exercising common acts of oversight over a common membership (largely composed of unfixed congregations and individuals).

_ How would we know how to restructure?

Through the use of general principles taught in scripture, our subordinate standards and through other writings authored by faithful teachers God has granted to the church for that purpose.

_ Is there some historical direction or guidance on

how to proceed?

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Yes (see method above)

_ What are we?

An association of individuals mutually consenting to a common government, which government is constituted (albeit extraordinarily) under the nearest Presbyterial rules of administration, and administratively acting by applying explicit terms of communion to all those having consented to the same. This common judicial assembly exercises an explicit general oversight (not applying to those essentially excluding themselves from the same) in this unsettled state within our period of history. We are a union of mutually consenting governors and members recognizing the blessing of government, and the necessity of continuing the ordinance in the house of God (such a house not being confined to the walls of a local congregation). We are an association of governors and members recognizing that such a house would be in no good condition without walls of discipline (judicial administration of terms of communion). We also recognize that when held in comparison to the absence of government, the potential of everyone doing what is right in their own eyes increases significantly. Though we recognize every circumstance does not present the opportunity for such an association, we nevertheless are happy to remain associated as such when the opportunity is present. An “express rule” for every circumstantial variation is not required when applying general principles. A simple review of our catechisms would reveal the essential nature of the approach itself – Q. 98 LC.

_ What are we members of; local Societies, or one

big international Congregation?

Both (if we don’t dispute about names). We certainly are not one “international local congregation” inclusive of all ordinances locally administered in an ordinary way. Nevertheless, whether we consider membership in reference to local societies/unfixed congregations, or membership within a more common union as a whole (collectively considered only, not properly a ‘congregation’ in the strictest use of the term), we are members under both considerations. However, membership is not confined to a collective association in whole or societal association in part, but as well extends to Individuals and single families as parts of the whole, albeit remotely in relation. Individuals and single families have just as much external and visible right to ecclesiastical ordinances as those residing locally to such ordinances. This necessarily must be the case, unless,

1. Circumstantial inconvenience excludes the application of mercy. Mercy is confined to a multitude locally congregated, but not extended to those scattered.
2. Walls of discipline are not mercy’s application to the Church, but apparently something to be detested, and a thing utterly forbidden to those in most need of the same.

_ Can we be members of a big international Congregation?

Focusing more carefully on the essence of things (not names), we can be members of one international association agreeing to the terms of communion administered by those called for that purpose. A mutual consent and agreement is a sufficient warrant and call for the exercise of this arrangement, whether in one congregation only, or in many, or yet more. The visible church is not confined to the walls of a single congregation. Such a tenant was the explicit position of those promoting an Independent form of

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government, which our Presbyterian fathers condemned over 350 years ago. Not only was such a tenant condemned 350 years ago, but was condemned over 2000 years ago when such a thing as judicial administration was instituted in the word for the well-being of the visible church (Eph 4: 10-16), not simply for the well-being of a local visible congregation.

_ What does our constitution look like?

Summarily considered, our constitution consists of that system of doctrinal principles and laws (summarily, and case applied) used to govern and/or instruct all those consenting to the administration of the same. They are summarily contained within our 6 terms of communion, and judicially applied by a collection of governors judicially united by an agreement to the same terms.

_ When were we constituted?

A constitution is actuated when there is an agreement between judicial members among themselves to unite in a judicial capacity. We were historically constituted when our elders judicially united under the name of the PRCE. Essentially considered, this judicial compact continued to exist under various circumstantial alterations; sometimes swelling in its judicial members, sometimes contracting. Nevertheless, the essential components of a judicial assembly have always existed, though numerically altered from time to time, and remotely accessed/exercised due to geographical alterations. The administration of ecclesiastical ordinance increases or decreases based upon the circumstance of administration (see ‘Technology & Communication’ section above).

“we will not envy our Brethren their tallness, we will desire to be low in our own eyes as well as we are in theirs, we confess our day is but the day of small things, yet we hope it is a time of love, far be it from us to say we are rich and stand in need of nothing, yet we hope when Presbyterian Government is up, we shall labour both by our Ministry and Discipline to present our members blameless before Christ.” -- Answer of sub-committee Pg. 117

NS

Section 2

History: “Public vs. Private”

Where is the public origin of the controversy within the RPNA?

"Again, the record of our forefathers is excellent in providing appropriate application to matters of a Public nature warranting Public Fasting. The Jan. 1 email did mention fairly specific private needs; a man's health and two men's vocational

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demands (respectfully, we can all likely sympathize). Respectfully, not willing to minimize these private needs as unworthy of prayer in other forums, you might argue a common need beyond other individual members; nevertheless, the recommended resources thus far, with the 21st fast approaching, fail to address the clearly Public aspects of the call." – PGS, 1/09/06

Here we have our dissenting brethren explicitly denying our elders’ circumstances to be of a common nature, squarely within the context of an ecclesiastical platform of government.

To assume the private circumstances of church officers (especially in our circumstances) have no public relevance, implies that our public platform of government (or court) is self-existing without any members. Because such an implicated notion of a self-existing public platform of government without members is absurd, so is the assumption that leads to it – modus tollens (if P then Q. Not Q, therefore not P). The correct position:

A public platform of government hinges upon the constituent members of the government in question. Therefore, what happens to them has relation to the public form of government itself.

To assume the private circumstances of our officers have no public relevance, consequently strikes against the existence (or warrant for the existence) of the government itself. When speaking of such officers and their circumstances, we’re not talking about “government” or “office” in the abstract, but rather in the concrete, as they are the constituent components establishing the possibility for government to function in any real sense. A superstructure’s existence is contingent upon the foundation it stems from; if you undermine the foundation, the superstructure collapses. The “superstructure” is the common government of this membership (in the abstract), and the “foundation” for such a common government’s function and existence is found in the members of the government (in the concrete). If you undermine the members of the government, you undermine the government itself. In the context where Christ’s ordinance is established, denying the foundation (the concrete) to have any relevance to the superstructure (the abstract) implies a self-existing superstructure (which is absurd):

“We distinguish between the ministry in the abstract, or the office itself which is Christ’s institution; And the ministers in the concrete, or the persons invested with the Office” - An informatory vindication, pg. 62

Denying the public relevance of our officers is also to effectively identify our officers as mere private persons. This would of course effectively strike against the warrant for the existence of a public platform of government. If the members of the government are merely private men without public relevance, how can there be a public form of government? If you undermine the relation to the public level, you undermine the function on the public level, and therefore the public level itself. Please see the Jan 1^st email below to evaluate the nature of such private circumstances, and whether they had any relation to a public platform of government, or not:

January 1, 2006

Dear Ones,

It is necessary in God's providence to make the
following three announcements for which we encourage

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you to devote time to God in prayer.

1. Due to the poor health and accompanying stress that
have come upon Elder Greg Barrow, we believe it is
necessary for him to take a two month leave of absence
from his duties and responsibilities associated with
his office as an Elder. Elder Barrow's blood pressure
and cholesterol level remain dangerously high. He is
presently having difficulty adjusting to the
medications that have been prescribed for this
condition. In addition, he continues to have weekly
bouts with kidney stones (that have continued for
approximately two years) and daily problems with a
sleeping disorder which prevent him from gaining
the rest he needs. We are sufficiently concerned for
his health that we, as a Session, have taken the step
to relieve him of his duties for the next two months.

2. This leave of absence comes at a time in which
Elder Lyndon Dohms has had an enormous amount of
responsibility placed upon his shoulders with the
death of his boss and friend, Ron Mix. Elder Dohms
will likely be in Louisiana for the next two months to
complete projects that are presently under contract.
As a result, Elder Dohms will likely have little or no
time to devote to the Eldership for the foreseeable
future. Pastor Greg Price simply cannot take up the
slack that is needed in such circumstances lest he
likewise suffer from the tremendous burden of stress
that would fall upon his shoulders. Our physical
limitations and weaknesses to carry on the work of
ministry have driven us to reconsider how our present
structure is able to compensate for these human
deficiencies in God's good providence. Even prior to
these most recent trials, we have felt stretched
beyond our limits. We have seen the effects in
our inability to keep up with the work load, to
minister to those who have needs, to relieve the
stress brought into our families, and to prevent
certain ill effects in our own bodies. We desire to
be around for many years to come in order to minister
to Christ's Church and to our families. For these
reasons, we will be praying and working to propose to
the Societies over the next couple months a
restructured organization for the RPNA. No doubt you
will have many questions at this time. We ask that
you patiently wait to hear from us the specifics of this restructuring when we make our public presentation. At this point in time, your questions
(though sincere) will only delay being able to take
these needed steps as quickly as possible. Of course,
during the next two months, if there is an emergency for
which you need the help of Pastor Price, please feel
free to contact him.

3. In light of what has been said, we call the

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Societies to a Day of Prayer and Fasting, January 21,
2006 for the purpose of humbling ourselves before God,
acknowledging our sins against the Lord and against
one another, and praying that God would be
merciful to us in strengthening our Elders, in
ministering to the needs of His people, and in
blessing the plans to restructure the RPNA. We will
be sending recommended resources as you prepare for
this Day of Prayer and Fasting.

Thank you all for your love, prayers, and
encouragement at this time.

The Session of The RPNA

More generally, would rebellion against parental authority within private homes be a warranted cause for a fast? Indeed it would be, as such behavior has obvious implications within the fabric of society on the public level. To exclude such an obvious connection would suggest a severe lack of understanding of cause and effect within societal relations (civil or ecclesiastical). Specific "private" circumstances, in some cases, have everything to do with public concern (as seen above) – all while maintaining the proper distinction between "public" and "private":

“Rebellion against parental authority is carried on by many children, and even mere babies, and frequently parents, instead of punishing, encourage and abet them in their rebellion until they are quickly beyond control; and then wonder why their children are so bad. Children thus brought up without the fear of God, manifest their lawlessness in their ecclesiastical and civil relations” – Minutes of the General Meeting of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, June 13, 1921: causes of fasting, point 6.

These are the reasons why I was troubled with the PGS’s public attempt to instruct the brethren and officers last year. I found this to be a grievous shot taken at the common leadership in our communion, and a misleading of the brethren more broadly; reduced to illustration:

Mother, Father, your circumstances have no relevance to the rest of us in the family. Your circumstances are completely delivered in the wrong forum. You might argue for a more common need or relation, but not us, as we’re looking for something more relevant to the public needs of the family. We’re approaching our tenth year in the family and you have failed to substantiate the public need. What makes you think your circumstances are of a common nature?

I was not offended by the PGS’s primary intention to make a public fast more meaningful (as I’ve more than once publicly stated, and as our dissenting brethren have consistently/conveniently skimmed over).

Rather, I was offended by some of the positions they assumed and the manner in which they presented them within the attempt itself. The fact that the PGS chose (conspired) to approach officers within our common government with such an erroneous position, when the same officers had explicitly requested time to deliberate over the current state of our church and how to manage affairs within the same -- together with the fact that they were in a weakened condition -- only aggravates the degree of error on their part (Q 127,

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128). Ironically, our very learned and humble brother, Mr. BS, who continually traces the controversy or “scandal” back to January, explicitly agreed with the core issue I addressed within the same period:

"1. I agree with it that the PGS request errs in not regarding the personal circumstances of health and workload with our elders as normally being a sufficient cause in itself to call for a public fast. We are talking about two out of three of our elders, not two out of three hundred, in which case it would be a different story." – Mr. BS, 1/14/06

Mr. BS did not show himself competent enough in identifying the logical consequences flowing from the explicit error of the PGS (or, he simply refused to draw such inferences due to their exposing nature – perhaps this assessment is too generous). The truth is, the presuppositions of these brethren were bleeding through – whether consciously, or unconsciously. I do find it interesting (though not surprising) that I was accused of having evil suspicions regarding this, especially in light of everything that has transpired since:

“Is there a defendable reason you so readily prosecute ‘Ad Hominem’ argumentation against me, casting unsubstantiated suspicions upon me? I will grant from other venues I am getting more used to it these last 18 months or so, but that does not make it any more agreeable to the Savior than any other false argumentation born of the flesh. I suggest in doing so, you do yourself a great disservice” – Mr. MG, 1/15/06

“In my last email, I related, ‘It seems obvious to me now, that hope for meaningful dialogue is compromised where suspicions remain [...] I doubt that issues can be fairly discussed in the existing climate and think the risks of continuing the email discussion appear unreasonably high. I also do not see a clear way to promote a moderate course of action.’ Your most recent emails have not eased these concerns, but actually increased them.” – Mr. MG, 2/5/06

Another example from Mr. BS,

“The self appointed prosecutor misconstructed their words and had evil suspicions about these brethren”

“Transparency”?

“Undoubtedly in great weakness, I do labour to be transparent before all my brethren (you included), if they ask anything of me. This has been since I was a youth, when I was taught that this is in love and service to my Lord (Matt. 25:40)” -- Mr. MG, 1/12/06

“Nevertheless, you reply to me by name in this public forum, as opposed to in my capacity as the lead writer on behalf of our Society to you volunteered reply of Monday, January 9, 2006. I do not take the role they task me with lightly, nor entirely

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joyfully I will confess; but the service I owe to my brethren here is in Christ.” – Mr. MG, 1/12/06

Mr. BS sets the record straight for us:

“It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004” – Mr. BS, 10/24/06.

“Transparent”? What’s transparent is the fact that these brethren have not been transparent. The nature of transparency cannot be squared with conspiracy; they are conflicting concepts. It would be more accurate to categorize these brethren’s activity as opaque, covert, and explicitly dishonest.

“The issues raised by the PGS were in the nature of promoting an even more meaningful day of public prayer and fasting. Simple, sincere and non-controversial.” – Mr. MG, 2/05/06

Questions:

1. How could a categorical denial of the circumstantial relevance of our elders promote a more meaningful day of public prayer and fasting?
2. How could the exclusion of a common nature from the elders’ judicial function (seeing as that was the subject matter within the elders’ January 1^st email) promote a more meaningful day of prayer and fasting, and not be interpreted as an Independent’s smack against the legitimacy of a common Presbyterial application of government?
3. In light of 1 & 2 (especially in light of all that has transpired since), how can the PGS email of January 9^th be interpreted as anything other than gross pretext mixed with rank Independency?

In light of this, observe the following misconstruction of intention, word, and action:

“That is, methinks and I wonder exactly what was going on regarding the eggregious public violations of the 9^th commandment and LC 145 re. ‘misconstructing intentions, words and actions’ of the SPG on the email list in January regarding the affidavit farce.” -- Mr. BS, 10/26/06

And what was Mr. BS’s position?

“It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004” – Mr. BS, 10/24/06.

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Some things are indeed opaque, while other things remain hopelessly transparent.

Perhaps the response will be as follows:

Your position seems to condemn these brethren for maintaining their position in private with the elders, and as well condemn them for going public with their positions. You’ve left them no option to maintain their position.

That’s precisely my position: they were wrong in private, and they were wrong in public. Our brethren had no “right” to maintain such a position in private, nor was there a “right” to maintain such a position in public. This is true even though it would have been more in keeping with the rules of the house for our brethren to keep such concerns between them and the elders -- obviously to avoid the destruction of a communion through the propagation of Independent doctrine throughout a common membership. Private judgment is not synonymous with private propagation/conspiracy. Consequence: the unraveling of a Christian communion (open your eyes).

Public misrepresentation/dishonesty: Societal intrusion?

The private origin of this controversy (at least any degree of involvement I had) did not start in January, but rather approximately three years ago when a member of the PGS (by this individual’s own free initiation) informed me of meetings potentially of a conspiratorial nature occurring within his/her society. I informed this individual that such meetings should not be taking place given their apparent nature, as they had the appearance of conspiracy (proving to be a threat to the public ordinances). I also informed this individual that he/she was not bound to confine his/her concerns to the society in question (in the case that issues could not be settled). The same individual was also stressing serious concerns about the leadership within the individual’s society -- also mentioning that he/she had expressed the same concerns to an elder within the church. The same individual raised issues regarding society and government with me. Many of the points I personally agreed with (on an intrinsic level). This individual was also apparently looked down upon because he/she refused to join certain conspiratorial meetings, because he/she “loved the elders, and would take no part in this!!”. With this, given the scattered conversations I’d had on the subject of society and government (among many other topics) with an elder, it was not difficult to put two and two together at this point. I did mention concerns I had to this elder, and had no problem with doing so. However, I did not relay every detail at that time (nor did he). Nevertheless, before expressing any concerns to this elder, this individual had already expressed to me that he/she had talked to the same elder about many of these concerns. Before this period, I did not know of any problems in the PGS. Whatever the case, I do not believe this individual was in sin for going outside his/her group when he/she could find no resolve (regardless of this individual’s gross misrepresentations, for which he/she ought to be extremely ashamed). Not being totally sure what to do under those circumstances, I decided to not act rashly or make a huge fuss over it out of concern for the individual and the others involved. I didn’t spread such things throughout the church (I didn’t know most of these people, except that they were my brethren). Would it have been a better option to confront the other individuals (which I did not do) rather than let it go, especially as this individual was coming to me essentially as a witness against the others? Perhaps it would have. However, if I had done that, I would have likely been accused of “societal intrusion,” and would then likely have been cut off. Ironically, some have publicly accused me of societal intrusion when the same society obtruded their “inquiry” into my inbox. It’s all quite interesting, really:

“It’s none of your business! Why are you intruding with this society’s matters!?!”

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Such accusations, together with the name calling (the precious comments flowing from our gentle sister, Mrs. WF, our ‘center of attention’ MR. BS, and of course our brave marine, Mr. EI) presents an interesting set of circumstances:

1. A member of the PGS came to me with problems by his/her own free initiation (I didn’t ask this of him/her).
2. The whole society came to me (and everyone) with problems (their public email 1/09/06) by their own free initiation, including explicit errors with severe consequences.

Who is being intrusive?

If societies do not want others involved with issues they’ve created, then I’d suggest the following:

1. Keep your society in order by eliminating problems so your members don’t flee to others for help.
2. Keep your private matters between you and the elders, and out of everyone’s inbox.
3. Don’t model your society according to principles of Indpendency or conspiracy.
4. Don’t explicitly present your issue as “common to all” and “relevant to the entire community” if you’re not comfortable with objective inquiry. Allowing presuppositions to surface through “questions” regarding a public fast is not the best way to conceal doctrinal “concerns” (but it sure is an effective way to propagate them, or at least strategically ‘lead into’ them, perhaps?):

Distinction:

1. A genuine question (questions exclusive of assertion)
2. A rhetorical question (assertion in the form of a question)

Example:

“Agenda was amended to allow discussion of ______ recent 4-step plan of establishing obstinacy, in which the first step would be to bring concerns/principles to the elders in the form of questions rather than conclusions.” – minutes from “The Effort” 7/30/06

Did these brethren really think their “questions” were not manifestly assertions? Again, some things are opaque, while other remain quite transparent.

Liberty of conscience?

Accusation # 1: “assaulting the consciences of the brethren”:

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"Nor as a free man in Christ, does one have to take it kindly when a brother assaults the rights of the members of the congregation to a free public and brotherly inquiry" – Mr. BS, 3/12/06

"Pseudo-presbyterian and self appointed inquisitors of the brethren's conscience of course, need not be bothered by such fine distinctions." – Mr. BS, 3/16/06

"Two, You wouldn't be arguing for liberty of conscience now, would you?

The only reason I ask of course, is because that is precisely what you wanted to deny the SPG all along. Liberty to ask a straight forward question of the elders re. the distinctions between public and private sins in light of the upcoming public fast." -- Mr. BS, 3/16/06

Mr. EI (jumping on the illogic bandwagon) has also made similar comments to this effect. Such an accusation is completely unfounded. This accusation was essentially a superb attempt to assault my conscience by calling into question my individual right (or anyone’s right) of Christian liberty to question a public inquiry that was obtruded into my inbox -- which public inquiry assumed/contained errors, having specific and potential implications. The fact that the initial public inquiry conducted by the PGS was qualified as "common to all" and "relevant to the entire community" constitutes a piece of evidence that only aggravates this frivolous accusation. Nevertheless, I do not believe such a qualification needed to be explicitly stated by the PGS in order for anyone to conduct inquiry on that common level. Ironically, it appears to our very concerned Mr. BS that "liberty of conscience" excludes any questioning of the PGS’s public inquiry in January – which he himself explicitly and publicly confessed to contain the core error within the controversy. Observe again…

"1. I agree with it that the PGS request errs in not regarding the personal circumstances of health and workload with our elders as normally being a sufficient cause in itself to call for a public fast. We are talking about two out of three of our elders, not two out of three hundred, in which case it would be a different story." – Mr. BS, 1/14/06

Here we find Mr. BS exercising his right to publicly inquire into the PGS’s public inquiry (even publicly agree with me regarding the error of it). Though Mr. BS will exclude liberty of conscience in reference to a public inquiry directed toward the PGS (which he himself is ‘guilty’ of), he takes all the liberty in the world to inquire into/attempt to evaluate my own public inquiry, as well as the PGS’s public inquiry (and many others).

In light of all this, double standards remain epidemic, and "liberty of conscience" is truly arbitrarily selective given these individuals’ modes of habitual contradiction and confused operation. It’s really difficult to take people of this quality seriously, or spend significant degrees of time on them in light of the same; it’s as if they really believe they are beyond all questioning. They assume liberty to conduct inquiries, but deny their inquiries are subject to the same – whether containing explicit errors, or not (ironically evidencing that such individuals covet implicit faith from their brethren). When the “soft spots” of their inquiry are touched, “the loudest voice wins” theory is then put into practice via temper tantrums by certain self-appointed/delusional “defenders of the dissenters and common faith”. “I was a marine, don’t

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play me like that, because I’m not one to be played,” together with a flurry of incessant barking highlighted by a curious interest in nursery rhymes and fairy tales from the other; foolish nonsense reserved for the most juvenile. However, it’s ironic that Mr. BS was in perfect agreement with me when identifying the essential error committed by the PGS. I actually thought Mr. BS identified the essential error quite superbly. It’s a pity that more thinking of that quality cannot extract itself from extinction (though it existed only momentarily – a sort of ‘natural selection’ in thought quality, if you will). What may have settled all this would have been a simple acknowledgement from the PGS confessing they had asserted an explicit error leading to bad conclusions in government. But this would not be acceptable for them, as they in reality owned the conclusions flowing from their explicit error (or flowing from their erroneous presuppositions). It all ended with dishonest accusations of “evil suspicions” from these brethren -- to the point of erecting an Independent/conspiratorial society right in the heart of our communion. Self-preservation? Self-preservation in error is never justified, nor is ecclesiastical mutilation justified (even though a political smiley face is annexed). Preservation should be assumed on corporate levels consenting under various circumstances -- 1Cor:12:14, Eph 4:11-16, Mt 12:7 – not confined to local Independent levels in an absolutistic manner guided by conspiracy.

Mutual assurance within a common membership excluded from membership.

Another accusation:

“Usurping the office and function of an elder” (more recently evidenced in the continual gnawing on the ‘Proxy elder’ bone):

"One of those principles of presbyterianism would be that if any one has the power or authority to put brethren under oath or demand an affidavit from them, it would be the elders, not some self appointed zealot on a fishing trip at large" – Mr. BS, 3/16/06.

"Because I repudiate and reject the brother's independent attempt to impersonate an elder, if not rather usurp the elders's judicial function and put communicant brethren in good standing under oath and on affidavit in the same public forum the brother attempts this hijack of presbyterianism" -- Mr. BS, 3/18/06.

"Consequently you wanted them to sign an affidavit because of your suspicions, if not what, you were working undercover for the "court?" Like they "owe" you an affidavit because of your Chicken Little rush to judgement? Pray tell where do you get these ideas about church government, due process, justice and equity? Please don't tell me it's from the third term of communion" – Mr. BS, 3/16/06

Mr. BS plays the part of an inventor/actor: he never fails to invent a straw man story that he might mock it on the stage of public attention. After erecting his straw men (habitually spreading falsehoods), he then immediately follows up with complex question fallacies regarding where the principles contained within his

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straw men originate (assuming his fictitious assessments to be true, then flailing away against the same). Mr. BS is an accomplished artist -- skilled in painting without a canvas for a foundation. Consequentially, the ground ends up saturated with colorful “constructs” resembling more of a sloppy mess fallen, rather than a carefully produced finished product standing. One might compare it to a form of painting used to vent emotions (an unstable man chaotically beating a wall with a paintbrush). I suppose the visual “cake” may be cut in different ways. If he isn’t void of a foundation, he’s destroying a foundation – one way or another, he operates without one. Mr. BS’s reason for his accusation: I questioned if a brother would be willing to establish an assurance of communion (when such communion was in severe doubt) via his word given in written form. The eminently humble and learned Mr. BS has absolutely confined such a question to those possessing judicial authority. Such an assumption was a clear attempt to assault my conscience by excluding my right (and consequently anyone else’s) to seek out the possibility of an assurance regarding a matter of mutual importance (concerning the duties of equals to one another relating to membership and superiors). Did Rahab assume judicial authority when she (in an act of faith) requested an oath from the spies? (Josh 2:12). If she sent the spies a letter asking the same, would she then have usurped a judicial function? Are we reduced to fallacious/absolutistic distinctions between “verbal” and “written” (morally considered)? Or, perhaps the incidental difference of communication through electronics vs. verbal or written makes up the grand distinction? If so, I suppose all the accusations and/or “questions” flowing from the keyboards of these brethren are necessarily nullified and unlawfully placed as well, and for this reason alone must be categorically classified as a baseless “testimony”. Asking an individual if he would be willing to sign an affidavit concerning an assurance of uniformity is not an act of authority:

Distinction:

1. A question of whether one is willing to give his word in written form.

2. Commanding an oath in a judicial capacity.

Here are the original questions:

1. Do you explicitly, fully, and cheerfully own the present extension of ecclesiastical government (known as the RPNA) as a lawful, faithful, and judicial court of Christ Jesus – agreeable to Biblical/Historical Presbyterian Church-government -- extending its authority over you in matters of morals, and good order, or not? Yes or no.

2. Do you own Mr. BS’s questions, assertions, and/or reasonings as having any basis or legitimacy? Yes or no.

3. If so, would you be willing to sign an affidavit to this effect (re: 1 or 2)? Yes or no.

They were carefully framed so as to exclude any extraneous political shifting/evasion – such “movements” so evident in most of those public communications last year (which was in essence confessed by one of their supporters), and as well to strike the root of a critical doctrinal problem driving these brethren:

“It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004” – Mr. BS, 10/24/06.

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A clear indication of this motivating factor was evidenced in their January 9^th email, along with another supporting Independent’s own public assertions -- Mr. BS -- together with an explicit invoking of the name of the PGS in reference to the same – 1/14/06. Nevertheless, it has never been specifically shown how asking a question of this nature assumed ecclesiastical authority, only abusively/habitually reasserted (straw man duplication). In my estimation, sadly (especially given the history of ‘court jester’ activity evidenced), it’s quite warranted to assume such accusations are nothing more than predictable knee-jerk instances of the hyper-emotional conditions some of these brethren intensely suffer from (in all charity) -- frequently (unfortunately) channeling through to their keyboards through the conduit of fractured attempts at “reason”.

Touching base with history, I wrote the following last year:

“[Mr. MG],

It really shouldn’t be a significant mystery as to why anyone would exercise liberty in these areas. The stated primary intention included within any Society’s/individual’s public letter – in this case, ‘promoting an even more meaningful day of public prayer and fasting’ -- does not exclude warrant for probing differing elements within the same public letter. This probing extends to elements assumed, or implicated – whether directly related to the stated primary intention, or indirectly related. It may be the case that you and the rest of the [PGS] are not comfortable with this (though, I take no pleasure in anyone being grieved). If so, this may suggest a curious lack of desire to be open about some fundamental issues. Nevertheless, a public inquiry is subject to inquiry itself, on the levels I’ve mentioned – especially when the inquiry is classified as "relevant to the entire community". These latter observations have relationship to both the matter, and as well the manner of a public approach (or private approach for that ‘matter’). Whatever the case, quite honestly, I’m curious as to why your response lacked a simple affirmation and/or denial, which would have hopefully entailed that we’re working on the same page -- particularly in reference to questions 1 & 2 in my last email. Are we on the same page? In relation to this, know also that private discussion is spawned from public discussion – affidavit request, or not. I’m confident that you’re not a stranger to this phenomenon of the development of ideas. "Just a coincidence? Hard to be sure, of course." Actually (setting that apparent hint of sarcasm aside), it’s easy to be sure on this one. It’s certainly no coincidence, and I was quite encouraged by the uniformity of thought within the private discussion (as I often have been).

This apparent issue of "confusion" is interesting. If resolution is truly desired, then simply reassure me that we’re on the same page regarding the public issues before us (especially # 2):

1) The idea of restructuring.

2) Restructuring what?

a. The existence of a lawful court of Christ.

b. The non-existence of a lawful court of Christ.

3) The question regarding extension of authority, which necessarily stems from a & b.

In relation to these questions, please see [Mr. BS’s] public response (1/14/06) which explicitly invokes the name of the PGS, issues of ecclesiastical government, and authority. I found this particular email to be quite alarming. Nevertheless, you can be sure, I wouldn’t assume (on an intrinsic level) that his discussing of such issues "disqualified" him to engage

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discussion "in any real sense." Again, I’m not fond of double standards, and open contradiction.

1 & 2 (above) obviously have reference to the questions I’ve raised in my last email. If this is squared away, we can then move on to less fundamental issues. The [PGS] initially inquired into the nature of this restructuring (impatiently, uncharitably, and unreasonably, in my opinion). I inquired into the [PGS’s] initial inquiry itself (see 1^st paragraph above, regarding differing levels of inquiry). At this point, it certainly appears that you do not desire to discuss such fundamental issues (the basic questions I presented in my last email, as one example). Honestly, I find your present inability to answer a few simple questions somewhat alarming. If we’re not working on the same page here, then the nature of inquiry may reach chaotic levels of interpretation, and as well reinforce a false front of pretended uniformity. Shall we square this away? Or, shall we leave the public oblivious to the existence or non-existence of such necessary degrees of uniformity – especially since the public has been included in an inquiry directed to their public officers. Anyway, I’d be happy to give you a sample answer to question 1:

1. Do you explicitly, fully, and cheerfully own the present extension of ecclesiastical government (known as the RPNA) as a lawful, faithful, and judicial court of Christ Jesus – agreeable to Biblical/Historical Presbyterian Church-government -- extending its authority over you in matters of morals, and good order, or not? Yes or no.

Answer: Of course I do. But [NS], what on earth does trying to make a public fast more meaningful have to do with this?

This answer would certainly not include an extraneous degree of qualification.

Your explicit attempt to clarify:

‘Future emails from you to me, if not of a brotherly quality speaking to first issues, will by God's grace not be answered publicly by me; I hope this explicitly clarifies on what basis I will happily receive future public contacts from you.’

‘If not of a brotherly quality.’ Interestingly enough, that’s a concern of my own (given the history of this public exchange). Nevertheless, I have spoken to first issues, left sufficient room for you to qualify, then moved on to a more fundamental approach given the development of the public discussion – hence the questions I presented in my last email. This is not primarily about a request concerning ‘public needs" regarding a fast (which I have already attempted to demonstrate), but,

1. About other impressions left, given the language used when the public request was first made (see paragraph 1 above for the method of approach. See also my second email).

2. Fundamental issues of relationship between society and government (which you refused to engage).

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3. An inquiry into the current position of individuals in relation to government, given what has developed in public (which you refused to engage).

Note also, that "first issues" may also cease to be first issues (in the sense of degree of importance) when other issues begin to surface. We’re obviously not confined to some wooden & sacrificial timeline to the exclusion of mercy & important development. Within the same vein, when a society approaches ecclesiastical government, in public, including many recipients, anyone may inquire into the nature of this approach. They may request the interpretation of the principles that govern the relationship between society and government – and as well other related issues assumed, or implied. Apparently, these are subjects -- for some reason -- that need to be avoided (at least up to this point). Nevertheless, I’d ask you again to simply answer the 3 questions in my last email. Honestly, what harm could it truly do?

Publicly engaging a path to fundamental reconciliation” -- NS, 2/9/06

Mutual assurances denied & ecclesiastical supremacy/antinomianism assumed, and propagated. The fruit of bonds broken, doctrinally stemming from isolated forms of government, and an apparent deep-seated love for preeminence

Requests on this level (mutual assurances) are not confined to those sitting in the judicial seat, else the 3^rd commandment only has essential reference to those possessing judicial authority -- which is absurd, being a specie of antinomianism (the 3^rd commandment only applies to judicial members?). It also implies an inordinate placement of authority in the judicial capacity:

Only rulers can request assurances (apply the 3^rd commandment), yet the people can request no assurances from their rulers, or their equals.

Such an assumption terminates in a nonsensical ecclesiastical/civil absolutistic supremacy -- against all law and reason. It’s a complete tragedy to see those who try so hard to be “the grand defenders of freedom against tyranny,” yet simultaneously invest rulers with exclusive rights when it comes to mutual assurances -- and who is elevating these elders implicitly and tyrannically? A twofold “tyranny of the laity”:

1. The explicit investment of exclusive right to rulers: requests for assurances may only flow from superiors.
2. Unrelenting public propagation (and ‘private’ propagation on privately and secretly organized levels) of this unsound principle throughout a membership -- all in the name of “Presbyterian principle” and “liberty”.

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Yet, on the other hand, in the context of a secret society known as “The Effort,” mutual assurances are assumed to be lawful, and even required among equals (albeit grossly conspiratorial):

“Each of us (including yourself) agreed to maintain confidentiality when we joined the Effort. On several occasions during your "membership" (so to speak) you honored this confidentiality agreement. When you left the group, we received assurance (via SA, who spoke with you directly) that you were willing to maintain confidentiality. If you break that confidentiality now, you will be violating your word. The fact that you have had concerns about the Effort does not in any way nullify this commitment that you have made; many of us share similar concerns as you in this regard, yet we are nevertheless willing to maintain the trust that our brethren have extended to us.” – Mr. SB’s “Effort” communication, 9/13/06

In the context of our membership, they deny mutual levels of assurance – condemning such mutual assurances as “tyranny over conscience” and “impersonation of elders”. Yet, on their own secretly organized levels they assume moral obligation regarding mutual assurance. What these brethren will condemn in one instance, they assume for themselves in another. Double standards remain hopelessly epidemic, so it seems. Nevertheless, applying Mr. BS’s logic (and some of other dissenting brethren’s logic), the secret society labeled “The Effort” was essentially an attempt to impersonate/usurp the essential properties of a judicial meeting, inclusive of “officers” holding each other accountable via oaths of assurance. It must as well have been an attempt to erect another judicial government within our membership -- soliciting other members to join such a newly formed internal judicial usurpation. Logically, according to Mr. BS’s principles, the “Charitable inquiry” was a product of an essential impersonation/usurpation of ecclesiastical authority, and the fruit of organized tyranny over the consciences of each member of “The Effort” -- as well everyone they attempted to recruit to such a tyrannical endeavor.

If this is not the case, then everything Mr. BS has asserted -- his continual gnawing and unrelenting effort in condemning a simple attempt to establish a simple assurance – immediately & hopelessly must crumble to the ground. However, I confess: these observations are only valid in the case of there being such a thing as logic in the world (let everyone consider their metaphysics).

Blasphemy implicated: Omniscience not prerequisite to ecclesiastical authority (implicit faith exemplified)

The same individual (Mr. BS) then asks the following:

"And why would someone need an affidavit from communicant brethren in good standing with no known warrants out for their apprehension by the authorities?"

Because seeking an assurance of communion is not contingent upon the presence of such a "warrant" by the authorities. Such a question assumes there must be judicial awareness/action before an individual can hold

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another individual accountable/gain an assurance -- which qualifies for a strange/blasphemous doctrine of visible communion in government and membership. A position that excludes the warrant for mutual accountability because there is no presence of judicial awareness/action, necessarily establishes omniscience as a prerequisite to rule in the judicial realm. Mutual accountability is not contingent upon judicial awareness/action, but ordinarily goes before the presence of judicial awareness/action – Matt 18: 15-17. Here we have another point of inordinate consequence – injecting an attribute of omniscience into qualifications for office (implicit faith exemplified). Note also, I did not unpack the method such a request would be accomplished. For my own part, involving the court in this matter would be the fruition of the request (especially since the issue so much involved the court) – which was attempted. I publicly stated the same on more than one occasion (a mystery?):

“It seems the latest response from [Mr. BS] may be an attempt to circumvent the process of our authoritative Presbyterian court. As I have clearly indicated in my last email, I intend to present my case to this ecclesiastical court (not a court of public opinion). A "case" will obviously include specific charges, and arguments reinforcing the same. The latest public display only highlights the necessity of this approach.” – NS, 3/18/07

Mr. BS obviously was not clueless in this matter (though he may be oblivious to his contradictions):

“In other words, FWIW my translation of the above is, the brother wanted to go the public route at first. Fine. But maybe things got too hot for the brother. So now he wants to go the way of official ecclesiastical discipline. That's fine too, (I look forward to cross examine/rebuttal.)” – Mr. BS, 3/18/06

It seems Mr. BS (along with the rest of these brethren) attempted to create a mystery out of facts that were plain as day for every eye to see – playing quite the part of a magician. Whatever the case, I do confess that our brethren’s approach in this instance is profoundly mysterious. Nevertheless, when the court convened it could not establish jurisdiction with these brethren (these brethren refused to own the jurisdiction of the court). Establishing jurisdiction was critical, as the court’s jurisdiction had already been publicly called into question. If a court does not exist over a people it may not assume jurisdiction over a people. It’s true, swearing an oath regarding truth of content is of a different nature than swearing an oath regarding owning a court’s jurisdiction. You obviously don’t often find the latter in civil courts because there typically is no question as to their jurisdiction within the case, only the truth of content within a testimony. However, courts have commonly had to settle jurisdictional issues before proceeding with a case (how anyone could deny this is baffling). A civil court’s jurisdiction is assumed when swearing an oath regarding the truth of content presented. In our case, however, not all parties believed the court existed, and consequently had any jurisdiction. This being the case, those who didn’t believe a court existed (if they were consistent) could not engage them as a court in any way, as they’d be 1) engaging a non-entity, and 2) engaging a non-entity arbitrarily extending its authority (tyranny defined). The elders seeing the obvious did the obvious – first seek to reaffirm the court’s jurisdiction (reaffirm membership commitments). Once jurisdiction was reaffirmed, then charges would be presented. In conscience (even if there were no oath), how could any of these brethren have received charges flowing from a non-existent court, and consequently applied in a non-existent jurisdiction (1Cor: 5:12)? “We never consented to your government” together with “we’re not aware of the existence of a court” together with “authority is only confined to local boundaries,” while simultaneously requesting “we have to see our charges before we participate”. This is truly nonsense. The elders had every right to first establish whether these brethren owned the jurisdiction of the court, as the dispute would have inevitably ended up there. If those accused did not own the jurisdiction of the court, then they would have obviously (if they were consistent) denied the judicial legitimacy of the charges, because in their mind they would have flowed from a non-existent court without any extension of jurisdiction. So, first things first. This obviously didn’t sit well with these brethren, and “playing ball” was confined to the court lawn outside (while the others were waiting inside):

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“While I can’t speak for the SPG, I think it safe to say that they, as well as I, came to play ball. I know I mean business.”-- Mr. BS, 10/26/06

Nevertheless, establishing jurisdiction was a judicial approach to first issues. Here we have a case of our elders being efficient with their time, and proceeding to fundamental issues rather than jumping through a series of political loops (Independent question spinning Penelope episodes). If our dissenting brethren are all for efficiency and expedience in administration, I’m sure they would agree with such an efficient and expedient administrative approach in this case. One of our dissenting brethren had the right idea on a conceptual level (though flawed in the extreme in its circumstantial application):

“Future emails from you to me, if not of a brotherly quality speaking to first issues, will by God's grace not be answered publicly by me; I hope this explicitly clarifies on what basis I will happily receive future public contacts from you.” – Mr. MG, 2/05/06

“First issues” may also be identified as “bones of contention”:

“It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004” – Mr. BS, 10/24/06.

With this “bone of contention” held in view, it’s somewhat striking how some of our modern dissenting brethren (quite publicly and obstinately) denied the existence/authority of this judicial assembly – which historically was essentially a declaration of non-membership and immediate self-exclusion – yet continue to quote subordinate documents regarding jurisdictional procedure in reference to membership. Quite simply, whether it’s the Books of discipline, The Order of Excommunication and of Public Repentance, The Westminster Confession, or even the scripture itself, the judicial processes mentioned in all these cases assume the following:

1. The presence of a commitment to judicial accountability
2. The absence of self-exclusion from judicial accountability

Judicial process is contingent upon those within the membership consenting to the government moving such a process--1 Cor 5:12. When members sever this tie, the essence of excommunication has already taken place (just not judicially prompted):

“That party having excommunicated themselves, no further action in their case by this Court is at present deemed necessary.” – Minutes of the Reformed Presbytery (US), June 2, 1886

“For what have I to do to judge them also that are without? do not ye judge them that are within?” – 1 Cor 5:12

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Category: Irrelevant thesis

Therefore, for those self-excluded, all appeals to subordinate documents (or even scripture) regarding judicial processes within contexts of jurisdictional consent should be categorically classified as an irrelevant thesis. Quantity of citation only multiplies quantity of fallacy instance (Mr. SB). An appeal to a thousand different species of trees is only as good as one grants the existence of soil – Mat 13:5, 6. In this case, such appeals to our subordinate standards are the equivalent of illegal immigrants screaming for civil liberties not belonging to them, as they have no membership within society – an Independent’s fallacy-fest.

Though a judicial acknowledgement of self-excommunication is not absolutely necessary, it certainly cannot hurt to make things quite clear (on a judicial level) in times of apparent ignorance. This is precisely what the elders within the RPNA did. Nevertheless, in reference to judicial process in the case of individuals not ejecting themselves from jurisdiction, Rutherford’s thoughts are always helpful:

“Christ’s order according to the number of steps are three, when the fault is private; scandals of many congregations cannot be private, and in public scandals we cannot go but to that church which the offence doth immediately concern; and if you make four steps or five according to your grounds, I see no transgression; if 1. You admonish the offender. 2. Before two. 3. Before the half of the Elders. 4. Before all the Elders, and 5. If you be willing that the Elders bring it to the hearing of the Congregation. The number three precisely are not of positive Divine institution, they are only set down by Christ to shew we are to labour to gain our brother in private before we publish his shame before the Church; and if he commit the offence before two, I think ye need not tell him yourself alone, but before two, and yet the offence is private, if three only be privy to it; seeing as it is not yet come to the Church. 3. I much doubt if no faults be punishable by excommunication , but only obstinacy: I think the atrocity of incest, parricide and the like deserveth excommunication, though no contumacy be supervenient to such crimes” -- Due Right of Presbyteies, pg. 313

“It is true, some are to be excommunicated for the very atrocity of the sin, it being parricide; but that is, because he giveth no positive signs of repentance to the Church, which is contumacy added to his parricide” – Divine Right of Church Government and excommunication, pg. 494

"For if the offence be committed before the sun at noon-day in the seeing and hearing of the church, either congregational or Presbyterial, as some may, and one do by word and writ openly blaspheme God: in this case Christ’s affirmative command, tell the church, doth not in conscience oblige one man to come and deal with the delinquent in private, and then (if he repent not) before witnesses, & then to tell the church, so as one sinneth if he tell not the church; for here God’s providence disposing of the notoriousness and publicness of the scandal doth tell the church." – Due right of Presbyteries, pg. 309 & 310.

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Though self-excommunication is no atrocity, it nevertheless, by its very nature, excludes the necessity of judicial measures taken to ascertain the presence/degree of obstinacy. Self-excommunication is a sure mark to prove one is quite obstinate -- not willing to assume accountability from any judicial member. This is obstinacy defined, and perhaps its fullest expression. If our dissenting brethren oppose this reasoning, they must first prove that judicial acts must be extended beyond the bounds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (an irony of ironies), and as well that a ministerial calling is contingent upon the same. In their attempt to prove this, they would then have to undermine the distinction between those within ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and those without – perhaps consequently establishing a sort of abusive ecclesiastical universalism in jurisdiction (yet another irony of ironies):

“For what have I to do to judge them also that are without? do not ye judge them that are within?” – 1 Cor 5:12

Ecclesiastically considered, their answer to Paul would have to be as follows:

“Paul, you have everything to do with judging them without, not only those within. You are in utter violation of due process and the principles of Presbyterianism”

These brethren’s mode of operation appears to have been as follows:

We desire the benefits of judicial process, though we will not own the existence or authority of a judicial structure moving such a process in cases of discipline. We desire the benefits of a membership, but we refuse to be held accountable by the rules of a membership. We desire our “case” to be heard over every rooftop, but we do not desire to be held accountable for the same. Any attempt at such will simply be viewed as tyranny: either of governors, or laity. Not only will we assume this, but will seek to publicly and privately defame those that sought to hold us accountable, as we’re more concerned about popular opinion as opposed to the preservation of justice, equity, and mutual accountability.

In essence, they desired to reside among us, but not be with us.

Fallacious imputation of unwarranted assumptions: Glaring contradiction & fundamental ignorance publicly evidenced.

"The only reason I ask of course, is because that is precisely what you wanted to deny the SPG all along. Liberty to ask a straight forward question of the elders re. the distinctions between public and private sins in light of the upcoming public fast. Instead you assumed they automatically must be disrespectful, disobedient and in rebellion to the "court." " – Mr. BS 3/16/06

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I didn’t need to assume anything of the PGS in order to be concerned, but only needed to work off the public errors the PGS made (Mr. BS explicitly confessing the core error), and draw the obvious conclusions flowing from them:

1. To deny that the elders’ private circumstances have public relevance, when the public form of government is contingent upon these very circumstances, is to consequently assert a self-existing government without members. If a superstructure can exist without a foundation, then the superstructure is self-existing (which is absurd); it cannot exist without a foundation. When you undermine the foundation of a superstructure (intentionally or not), the superstructure collapses – either actually, or in abstraction. The “superstructure” is the common government of this membership (in the abstract), and the “foundation” for such a common government’s function and existence is found in the members of the government (in the concrete). If you undermine the members of the government, you undermine the government itself. Intention and effect often collide, yet sometimes there really isn’t properly any “collision” under this consideration, as the whole process may flow from the design of those undermining.

2. To deny the elders’ circumstances had any public relevance is essentially to treat them as mere private men, without public relevance. Consequently, this is to deny the existence of a public platform of government – and therefore its authority (authority is contingent upon existence).

3. Mr. BS established the warrant to proceed more pointedly by explicitly calling into question the existence of a court, and publicly invoking the name of the PGS in reference to the same (see Mr. BS’s email – 1/14/06 – to establish context). A denial of the existence of a court implicates a denial of the authority of a court: authority is contingent upon existence.

4. My inquiry was not primarily directed toward the PGS’s primary intention in their request concerning the fast (as I’ve publicly made clear on more than one occasion), but rather the language used/positions assumed within the request itself (see 1-3 above. See also Mr. BS’s public confession –1/14/06-- regarding the PGS’s public error noted above).

“Thus, my questions were primarily gauged to address the aspects I engaged, though not every aspect of the original email from the PGS. Indeed, I am not at odds with every aspect (when certain aspects are intrinsically considered). I addressed the ones that concerned me” – NS, 1/11/06

In reference to 1-4, observe the following:

"What then do we have? Not an ordinary session, but an extraordinary session of a nonexistent presbytery? I don't know. Do you? Who exactly are we?" – Mr. BS – 1/14/06

"Yet again, is the real question whether we need to restructure the church - we do - or rather do we first need to repent of the public sins we are guilty of as members, officers and the church collectively before God, particularly as regards church government?" – Mr. BS, 1/14/06

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"Rather what I am saying is that maybe we had better be careful of calling ourself something we are not. Do you not think brother, that the Lord might have something to say about that? Could it be possible that we who are the perfect presbyterian church, because we are the covenanted presbyterian church, could it be possible that we sin in this regard to church government?" – Mr. BS, 1/14/06

"After all it has been almost three years since the dissolution of presbytery without a word further on where we are at in our church government, but now restructuring our government is on the table. Yet the one burning question would have to be: restructuring from what to what? Would it be too much to ask anybody to attempt to understand why someone might be more than a little skeptical/pessimistic about the whole thing?" – Mr. BS, 3/12/06.

"As for mentioning any of this regarding our church government in public, the fact of the matter is that quite simply no one should have to ask anybody about these matters, privately or no. As a matter of course the congregation should be informed about the changes in our name and government as part of due process and good order in government, ie. standard operating procedure in the Church of our Lord Jesus Christ" – Mr. BS, 3/12/06

It’s important to understand that Mr. Mr. BS’s concern was not merely in reference to the "name" of an ecclesiastical government, but had its final reference to the essence of the ecclesiastical government presently applied:

"We do happen to be on record though, of calling ourselves the Session of the RPNA General Meeting, Sun. Oct. 31, 2004 through Oct. 23 2005 and now the Session of the RPNA Sun. Jan 1 & Tue. Jan. 10, 2006 in the various announcements/letters of those dates from our elders. But not to nitpick, I really could care less about the name ultimately. What matters is the substance." – Mr. BS, 1/12/06

With these premised, observe the next series of public statements in contrast:

“That said, in the main I still agree with the overall thrust and concern of the PGS request, which again does not question the lawfulness of the elders's authority, nor even the lawfulness of their authority to call a fast. Rather contrary to the repeated misreading of it, it is a request to the lawful authorities to further clarify the public, as opposed to private, "sins against the Lord and each other" which we are being called to confess and humiliate ourselves before the Lord publically.” – Mr. BS, 1/16/06

“That is, it is not yet a sin to ask an honest question of the authorities in the church, and someone ought to be able to do so without being harassed by a brother to sign an affidavit because he suspects they really, really are questioning/denying the authority of the elders.” – Mr. BS, 3/16/06

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“You said [NS said – NS]: ‘I do this assuming the absence of owning this ecclesiastical court, in its present extension, is effectively a declaration of non-membership’. Again, you continue to labor under the misconception that your say so, makes it so, as if people are nonmembers because you think so. Better think again. – Mr. BS, 3/16/06

With these premised, it’s somewhat striking how Mr. BS claimed membership and to own the lawful authority of the government of this church within that period, while simultaneously declaring he was not aware of its existence. The lawful authority of a government hinges upon the existence of a government. Why our eminently humble and learned brother could not understand the necessary relation between the two will perhaps forever remain a mystery. It’d be just as fallacious/foolish for one to claim membership within a company (inclusive of employers having authority), and then within the same breath deny the company’s existence – superb logic. The possession of an attribute is contingent upon the existence of being; a non-entity obviously cannot possess an attribute. It apparently didn’t occur to this poor man that he was speaking ecclesiastical/philosophical nonsense. Some 9 months later, it finally dawns upon him that authority is contingent upon existence:

“The imposition of the oath owning the court's authority is a violation of due process because it is premature at this stage and again begs the question. It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004” – Mr. BS, 10/24/06.

“I don't know. Do you? Who exactly are we? After all it has been almost three years since the dissolution of presbytery without a word further on where we are at in our church government. restructuring from what to what? That said, in the main I still agree with the overall thrust and concern of the PGS request, which again does not question the lawfulness of the elders's authority, nor even the lawfulness of their authority to call a fast. Rather contrary to the repeated misreading of it, it is a request to the lawful authorities to further clarify the public, as opposed to private… Again, you continue to labor under the misconception that your say so, makes it so, as if people are nonmembers because you think so. Better think again. The imposition of the oath owning the court's authority is a violation of due process because it is premature at this stage and again begs the question. It assumes a court exists when that is exactly the bone of contention between the SPG and the elders ever since July 2, 2004 “ (compiled from quotes above).

I confess that I’ve had a difficult time taking this individual seriously.

Touching base with the history, I wrote the following:

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“My first set of questions was primarily addressing this notion of "Public versus private". There was a clear impression (in my own eyes) that there was a denial that such private issues, relating to the elders’ circumstances, had any degree of Public concern. I found this quite disturbing given the obvious format the elders have been operating upon. The degree of emphasis placed by the PGS on this particular seemed to function upon a sweeping aside of the lawfulness of the present application of ecclesiastical government (regardless of what may have been hinted afterward). To explicitly or implicitly deny that circumstances of a private nature (regarding our elders) will very much affect a public platform of government (albeit extraordinary), especially within our current context, left me wondering about the PGS’s view of the current format itself -- hence, my questioning of the same. The emphasis placed upon the impossibility of any authority on this earth to erase the distinction between "public and private" is entirely an irrelevant thesis. Who ever questioned that? However, this does not address how private circumstances may influence a public platform. Enter extraordinary instances, and what I’m highlighting will become all the more relevant. Enter our own circumstances, and my point is proved. If the impression left (to me at least) is not the case, then I will happily leave it there.” – NS, 1/11/06

“In my estimation, I was never given an impression from the elders that Greg Price was going to handle the entire work of "restructuring". I wouldn’t have nearly assumed it. Unknown consequences do not hinder the warrant for a day of prayer and humiliation, but often times warrant the same. This is not blind faith, but rather the consequence of lacking a divine attribute (omniscience). I speak here of any potential consequences of restructuring, and knowing them absolutely. To label the act of placing confidence in our elders, to the end that they might wisely restructure, an act of blind faith, is somewhat remarkable in my eyes. It hints of a lack of charity, and unwarranted suspicion? In my estimation, the wisdom needed to restructure, in an orderly way, is quite a convenient occasion for a fast. I’m also confident the elders will handle themselves in accordance to what is expedient – serving the most expedient end relating to societies, yet shunning conspiracy” – NS, 1/11/06

Nevertheless, on the other hand (perhaps simultaneously, as contradiction’s collision is epidemic) if these brethren were merely equivocally saying they owned the authority of these men, harboring a hidden qualification such as “we own them as lawful only in their own locations over their own only, and not over any others,” then critical problems still remain:

1. This is Independency defined: "There must be many elders appropriated to these congregations, which have power over their own only and not over others” -- Thomas Hooker (see Rutherford’s ‘A Survey of the Survey’ Pg. 245, 246)
2. How could one own the lawful authority of officers within those local settings while simultaneously accusing them of arbitrarily extending their authority? The arbitrary extension of authority is the essence of tyranny. You obviously could not consistently/conscientiously own them as lawful even within their own local settings. If this were the case, we’d then have brethren apparently willing to own officers as “lawful” while the same officers were simultaneously functioning upon the essence of tyranny within their own local settings. Question spawn:

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1. Does “distance” qualify whether we own a minister as lawful or not?
2. Can we own unfaithful ministers running a platform of tyranny as long as we are not local to their ministry?
3. Or, perhaps that “phase” had not been entered into yet? (Our dissenting brethren would most likely choose this option).
4. Is this a point-blank promotion of pure sectarianism?
5. Or, is this simply another example of the consistent confusion/contradiction evidenced by these individuals in ecclesiastical matters while simultaneously operating as if so sure (but not so sure, as they’re ‘merely asking questions’)?
6. All of the above?

Public discussion/disagreements

There’s obviously nothing inherently wrong with public discussion. There’s nothing inherently wrong with public disagreements either. Public discussions/inquiries/disagreements can actually be quite profitable. However, when individuals participating in the discussion begin to assume elements that undermine real membership commitments -- such as a strike against the lawful existence and authority of those overseeing our communion -- this is when the “discussion” takes on a different nature. When issues clearly grew increasingly more offensive in this way, I tried to follow the nearest ecclesiastical rule by delating such offenses to the eldership for judicial mediation -- to the end that they might be judicially resolved there, not resolved in a court of public opinion within a membership, as was evidenced by those attempting to circumvent the authority of our eldership. However, quite predictably, these brethren would not own the jurisdiction of this ecclesiastical court:

Distinctions:

3. Discussing/disagreeing in public in such a way that does not undermine membership commitments (1Cor10: 32, 33 – a fortiori).
4. Discussing/disagreeing in public in such a way that in fact undermines membership commitments (Rom16: 17).
5. Delating an increasingly scandalous situation to an eldership for moderation and judgment (Mt18: 17).
6. Delating an increasingly scandalous situation to the populace for moderation and judgment, with the intention/effect of circumventing judicial process -- Mt 7: 16, 27: 22-27 --- resulting in the inhibition of justice & lawful judicial decision.

Publicly pointing out those guilty of #4 is not an instance of being guilty of the same error (as Mr. BS has foolishly/fallaciously/flippantly argued), but diametrically opposed to it. These brethren were obviously seeking a public forum to propagate their principles – which they knew good and well ran contrary to their membership commitments. The fact that someone stood up in the market place (as it were) and told them what they were doing was wrong, does not assume an element of hypocrisy, but rather assumes disagreement with those attempting to stir up a multitude to gain a popular vote. I suppose it’s somewhat obvious why they would rather have everyone simply be quiet and grant them an unlimited public forum (implicit faith coveted), rather than step up and question their explicit errors leveled against an eldership/membership (implicit faith denied).

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The essence of things in question (not names): Non-existence of an extraordinary judicial assembly?

"Changing the "form" of organization from a Presbytery [common presbytery in greater numerical form – N.S.] back into a state in which one teaching elder and two ruling Elders [common presbytery in lesser numerical form – N.S.] have the general oversight over the Societies does not alter our membership commitments or change the status of those who have already passed our communion examinations. Those who were formerly members we still consider to be members and those who were allowed to come to the communion table can still do so” – 6/14/03

“We do not believe that the error of one man (which consequently led to the dissolution of Presbytery) [common presbytery in greater numerical form – NS] make null and void all of our membership agreements, and our mutually expressed unity in the truth with their mutual duties. If we maintain that one Pastor's defection from the truth can void other real agreements, then our whole visible unity is based "not" upon the truth, but hangs merely upon unknown future circumstances or the alteration of one Elder's beliefs, which may variously alter our outward form of government" – 6/14/03

Question: Within this context, is there such a thing as non-judicial oversight (Acts 20:28)?

Answer: No

Question: Did the elders explicitly assume an outward form of government?

Answer: Yes

1. “Alteration” does not assume elimination.
2. “Our outward form of government” assumes the existence of a form of government in the present tense:

Distinction:

7. The condition of a thing (alteration of an existing form of government)
8. The existence of a thing (elimination of all form of government)

The elders explicitly stated the continuation of “oversight” within an “altered outward form” of “government” in the present tense.

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“Changing the "form" of organization from a Presbytery back into a state in which one teaching elder and two ruling elders have the general oversight over the Societies does not alter our membership commitments or change the status of those who have already passed our communion examinations...”

Question: Back into what? In the “state” preceding the numerical increase of officers within this common government (the ‘state’ the elders were moving ‘back into’), what function was the eldership exercising in relation to membership?

Answer: Admitting and demitting individuals into a common membership (not a local or fixed membership) inclusive of an explicit general oversight over all those consenting to the same. This format essentially presupposed the reality of a universal visible Church, and the existence of remote members of the same (remote members identifying with particular ecclesiastical sections within the universal visible church).

Historically, this was the practice (whether the dissenting brethren in our own day agree with the platform, or not). Therefore, when the elders reference this former condition of government inclusive of admitting and demitting individuals into a common membership (though not a local and fixed membership), why would anyone assume they meant anything other than the same when the historical instance was explicitly invoked in the 2003 communication? To assume they meant otherwise runs squarely against the historical context -- which context is even affirmed by those denying the existence of a court after the period of “dissolution”. “Why use ‘dissolution’ language then?” Good question, as it wasn’t necessary (in my estimation). In essence, the only thing that “dissolved” was an eldership in greater numerical form. Former agreements do not dissolve due to the termination of one elder’s membership within a common court (as long as the constituent components of an essential judicial assembly still remain – the substance of which is found in The form of Presbyterial Church-Government, pg. 404, 405). The elders of the RPNA explicitly stated principles assuming the same. Numerical changes in the outward form of government do not necessitate reconstitution. Applied on a local congregational level:

Six elders reside within a congregation. One dies (or is providentially removed). Therefore, the eldership by default necessarily dissolves, and the court must disappear? Enter necessity to reconstitute? Another elder is providentially removed. The eldership dissolves, and the court must disappear? Enter necessity to reconstitute? (Down to 4 elders). Another elder is providentially removed. The eldership dissolves by default? Enter necessity to reconstitute? (Down to 3 elders), etc.

Is this approach reasonable or necessary? It seems rather superfluous, really.

How about on a common level paralleled with a more local level?

“The whole elders of six congregations in a City may all meet in one common Presbytery, without any delegation; and that is Presbyterial Church, as is the meeting of a congregational Eldership” – Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the survey, pg. 186

One of those elders within the common government dies. Does this undermine the essence of the common government? If the common government decreased in members (numerically reduced to the smallest presbyterial form sustaining a court – Form of Church-Government, pg. 404, 405), where in Christ’s word

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are they forbidden to rule due to such a circumstance? Where in Christ’s word can it be shown that they’d be necessitated to reconstitute, or disband – especially if they retained sheep consenting to their common government?

Distinctions:

3. Judicial authority essentially considered
4. Judicial authority extensively considered
5. Judicial authority settled (advanced context with internally tightened boundaries subject to the formation of higher courts)
6. Judicial authority unsettled (less advanced context with a more common boundary having no settled gradations)

“The two first Pillars of a Presbyterial Church, to wit, 1. Framed Churches. 2. Formal commissioners sent to Presbyteries, are to us no pillars. To Mr. Hooker they are” – Samuel Rutherford, marginal note on pg. 186, Survey of the Survey

The highest degree of a thing is not necessary to define the essential nature of a thing. It’s grossly fallacious to premise the absence of higher degrees in order to prove an absence in essence. It’s also grossly fallacious to merely assert one is not advancing essence arguments, when in fact the “essence” of their argument is purely an essence argument. Essence arguments veneered with “expediential only” will not qualify: give it the nature of a thing, and you have the thing itself.

Our modern day dissenting brethren could not have owned the judicial assembly within our membership even when there was a greater quantity of officers. Given their doctrine (given their Independency), an officer must absolutely be within “shoulder brushing” range for them to perform acts of government. Though “shoulder brushing” range or cohabitation is a more convenient and ordinary circumstance highly desirable, it is not so utterly essential as if government cannot function without it – unless of course the universal visible church is not so universal after all. Or, perhaps by “universal” our dissenting brethren would somehow confine a universal nature within the walls of a local congregation. If this were the case, then the only visible church existing would be a local congregation – Independency defined – and Christ’s gift of ministry would then be exclusively assumed to apply to local levels (brushing shoulder levels), but not possibly extending to any others within the visible church if a call were received. This is a merciless principle of government. Does tyranny by definition exclude mercy? If so, then what might be said of an Independent form of government?

“We answer, (not to dispute how hard it would be for our brethren to prove clearly that distinction of the several names and work of these Elders in Israel; & etc) we inquire not after names, but things: And as for the thing in question, we have already cleared, that the scripture holds out, that as the Church is one, and all the Elders given for the good of that one Church; so their Officers (when orderly called for) should be exercised in any part of it for the good thereof; and that a mutual consent and agreement, is a sufficient warrant and call for the exercise of this power, whether in one Congregation only, as suppose in

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Cenchrea, or in many, as suppose in Jerusalem, or yet more, as suppose when Antioch and Jerusalem joyned, Act. Chapt. 15 that in any of these, or all of these, they may, and ought, upon such a call, exercise any of their gifts and offices, as the Church, or any part therof shall stand in need.” -- Answer of the Westminster Assembly of Divines to the Dissenting brethren, pg. 8.

Conspiracy

Conspiracy: 1 a secret agreement between two or more people to perform an unlawful act 2: a plot to carry out some harmful or illegal act (especially a political plot) 3: a group of conspirators banded together to achieve some harmful or illegal purpose (2005 Princeton University)

Conspiracy: 1: the act of conspiring together 2: a: an agreement among conspirators b: a group of conspirators (Webster’s Collegiate)

Conspiracy: Agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means (Webster’s Collegiate encyclopedia).

Conspiration: 1: the act or action of plotting or secretly combining (Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary)

Conspire: To join in a secret agreement to do an unlawful or wrongful act or an act which becomes unlawful as a result of the secret agreement (Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary).

Though secrecy is essential to the nature of conspiracy, secrecy is not intrinsically unlawful. What makes a meeting or agreement "conspiratorial" is rather a combination of a few essential components:

1) Secrecy

2) unlawful intent/effect toward others

3) plurality of persons

4) Formal or tacit compact

It would be interesting to see how our dissenting brethren define the term "conspiracy," and as well how they would apply it. Merely meeting in private is not conspiracy by definition. If it were, this would potentially undermine every private instance of meeting on any level (familial, ecclesiastical, or civil). The nature, scope or design of the meeting determines whether it is of a conspiratorial nature, or not.

Question: Would a private meeting founded upon rules of secret compact, which secret meeting (therefore) ran squarely contrary to other membership agreements within a more common membership (proving to be a threat to the same) be considered conspiratorial?

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Perhaps the answer will be as follows: "No, because our intent was not unlawful, but the membership agreements on the more common level were unlawful – which consequently forced us to preserve ourselves in our private effort".

1. Such a response would beg the point in question, as it’s the nature of the intention being questioned.
2. Such a response would present point-blank contradiction with the "we’re just asking questions, merely inquiring, nothing more" platform, as the answer assumes the presence of conviction and conclusion, not mere questions with uncertain answers. If individuals were operating upon conviction and conclusion when secretly meeting, yet simultaneously telling others they were merely asking questions that were non-threatening to the present membership, in such a case we would then have intentional deceiving of persons – all to the end of establishing a hidden agenda. This being the case, "lawful intent" becomes "unlawful intent".

Is this lawful within a membership? If not, then we’re left with a secret meeting of persons compacting together, with an unlawful intent/effect toward others – conspiracy defined. It’s not lawful to lead others on as if seeking to strengthen the elders and membership, when the same individuals have secretly concluded to propagate principles that would inevitably tear the union down. Deception is the act of causing one to believe something as true or valid when it is in fact false or invalid (an unlawful creation of a false impression – aggravated more intensely when accomplished on secretly organized levels gauged to affect a multitude). On this level, any other doctrinal concerns flowing from such individuals are irrelevant. There of course may have been gross ignorance of the essential nature of what was taking place on the part of some involved with this secret society, but certainly not all (perhaps I’m mistaken).

Quite predictably, some have attempted to redirect attention away from their own errors by falsely accusing others of the same errors (outlandish accusations of conspiracy regarding a trip to Colorado). Thinking of this nature is quite disturbing; it’s as if one can’t visit his brother and sister (along with one of his elders) without a handful of individuals waiting on the edge of their seats for a moment to create an ecclesiastical drama out of it -- an obnoxious “soap opera” mentality, if you will. It’s also somewhat disturbing that these individuals seem to have concluded all visible communion among those within our church must cease because a group of protesting Independents say so. It’s as if we have to have their permission to visit one another (as we have in the past), and when they lose the attention they feel they deserve, they then condemn everyone around them – a display of pure self-centeredness and absolute arrogance. In all consistency, such micro-management attempts would have been better off if left within their own local settings, and left with those foolish enough to consent to the same. The irony is that one of their main protests has to do with mutual encouragement and knowing the minds of one another (which intrinsically considered is true, and was never contested). How they could assume this, and yet simultaneously condemn simple fellowship among brethren doing essentially the same thing – especially while the seeds of conspiracy were being planted behind our backs – is astounding. The apparent conclusion on their part:

Any individuals exercising visible acts of communion (not conspiratorial), though not agreeing with their essential Independency, must be categorized as “an appearance of evil”.

Given this apparent assessment, it’s no longer surprising that such divisive brethren care so little about our communion, and would seemingly do anything to tear it down – even conspire against us while they were among us, yet explicitly telling us otherwise. In the end, a group of believers consenting to a common government, mutually encouraging one another the best they can under the circumstances do not need brethren of this quality. Sadly, such brethren will prove to be troublesome members; persons of weak, jealous and suspicious minds, always ready to imagine and construe the worst of the words and actions of

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their brethren – brethren on the judicial level, or non-judicial level. This is quite the irony considering how hard our dissenting brethren have promoted religious societies, yet simultaneously unraveling the essence of the same -- even as they’ve unraveled one another.

Habitual mockery

“Whoso mocketh the poor reproacheth his Maker: and he that is glad at calamities shall not be unpunished” – Prov 17:5

For those individuals that have chosen the slanderous path of habitual mockery, who cannot but continue to enthrall themselves in the same, the Lord certainly will not fail in taking notice. The punishment of such individuals is perhaps their blindness in being seated in the chair of the scoffer. Their case is judgment-like: a dark cloud perpetually hovering over their heads throughout all their wicked endeavors against the quiet in the land. Their god is their belly -- continually feeding on their self-delight in exposing their shame to the world, without apology, or an apparent moral consideration regarding the ugly stain they have made of themselves. Their condition is notorious -- self-evident for every discerning eye to mark as such. Such habitual mockers seemingly never cease to defame their brethren; thriving on drawing them into circus formats inclusive of circus platforms pumped and primed with poisoned wells of character assassination, and embarrassing “tease episodes” of kindergarten logic. This is their chief joy and strength against their brethren: “keep the ball of slander rolling, as the world will feed on it, and the weak and ignorant will follow. We will appear well in their undiscerning eyes, and this is satisfying to our souls”. This also applies to those sophomoric stragglers who’ve proven themselves to be nothing more than cancerous members -- never failing to misrepresent their brethren, and the entire state of the case. They are haughty wanderers intoxicated with novelty, and bizarre eccentrics. They are whimsical in their approach -- daily flinging themselves about in the cesspool of habitual misrepresentation, false report reception/propagation, and ecclesiastical soap opera intoxication. They are notorious pragmatists – adopting any form that will work well to suit their own ends. May God send us better visible communion subjects than these…

Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? -- Mt7: 16

NS